


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TROOP CARRIER OPERATIONS 1944

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Headquarters Twelfth Air Force

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2 MAY 1945


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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH AIR FORCE
APO 650, U. S. Army

15 March 1945

The 51st Troop Carrier Wing in 1944 played a most significant part in operations both in the Mediterranean and the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations. This report presents a survey of their activities, showing the wide variation in the range of their efforts.

Troop Carrier's work is carried on quietly, many times necessarily in secret. Its labors seldom find the place they deserve in the public eye. It is believed that this account will point up the importance of its role and the difficulties and dangers that it faces in the accomplishment of its mission.


JOHN K. CANNON,
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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LOD DIR 5200.10

TROOP CARRIER OPERATIONS

1944

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE

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I. ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF UNITS

ORGANIZATION AS OF 1 JANUARY 1944

1. At the beginning of 1944, Troop Carrier units under the Twelfth Air Force consisted of the XII Troop Carrier Command (Provisional) with its headquarters at FALERMO, under which were two wings and various service units. The 52nd Troop Carrier Wing, located at AGRIGENTO had the 61st, 313th, 314th and 316th Groups, each consisting of four squadrons, and the 302nd Signal Company, Wing. These groups were located at SCIACCA, MILO-TRAFANI, CASTELVETRANO, and BO RIZZO respectively and the Signal Company at AGRIGENTO. While the 52nd Wing was thus concentrated in Western SICILY, the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, with but three exceptions, was equally concentrated in South-Eastern SICILY. Wing headquarters, the 314th Signal Company, Wing, and the 4th Squadron, 62nd Group, were at CATANIA: Headquarters, 60th Group and the 11th, 12th and 28th Squadrons at GERBINI: Headquarters, 62nd Group and the 7th, 8th (ground echelon only) and 51st squadrons at FONTE OLIVO: and Headquarters, 64th Group and the 16th, 17th, 18th and 35th Squadrons were stationed at COMISO. The three exceptions were the 10th Squadron, 60th Group, which was at POMIGLIANO, ITALY, the air echelon of the 18th Squadron, 64th Group which was on duty at EL ACUIDA (TUNIS) with Mediterranean Air Transport Service, and the air echelon of the 8th Squadron, 62nd Group at GIOIA DEL COLLE, in Southern ITALY. In addition, there were five other units assigned directly to XII Troop Carrier Command: the 908th Air Base Security Battalion, the 1281st Military Police Company, the 802nd and 807th Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadrons all located in SICILY, and the 6729th Administrative Platoon, Air Force Rest Camp (Provisional) which ran a Rest Camp Hotel on CAPRI.

REORGANIZATIONS OF FEBRUARY - MARCH 1944


2. Departure of the 52nd Wing. On 14 February, the 52nd Wing and its four groups were relieved from assignment to the Command and to the Twelfth Air Force, to be effective upon departure from this theater. The order had been anticipated for some weeks; and by 23 February, the rear echelons had departed from SICILY, en route to the UNITED KINGDOM where they were assigned to the Ninth Air Force

3. Consequent Reorganizations. This departure of the 52nd Wing created a series of changes in the organization of Troop Carrier units:

- a. Effective the 20th of February, the 302nd Signal Company, Wing, the 908th Air Base Security Battalion, the 1281st Military Police Company, and 802nd and 807th Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadrons, and the 6729th Administrative Platoon, Air Force Rest Camp (Provisional) were all transferred into the 51st Wing. The 51st Wing, itself, was relieved from assignment to the Command and assigned directly to the Twelfth Air Force.
- b. By this same order, the Command was ordered to disband as of 5 March 1944, which was carried out on that date.
- c. Further readjustments followed shortly. On 23 February, the 6729th Administrative Platoon, Air Force Rest Camp (Provisional) was transferred to AAFSC/MTC. On 2 March 1944, the 314th Signal Company, Wing, was transferred to 90th Photographic Wing, Reconnaissance; and, on 5 April, the 1281st Military Police Company was transferred to AAFSC/MTC.
- d. These transfers completed the reorganization of Troop Carrier units into the form under which they were to continue for the remainder of the year. The 51st Wing was now assigned directly to the Twelfth Air Force for administration and to MATAF for operational control. Under it were the 60th, 62nd, and 64th Groups, some parts of which, as will be discussed under operations, were almost always under the operational control of other air forces. In addition, the Wing had assigned to it the two Air Evacuation Squadrons, the 302nd Signal Company, Wing, the 908th Air Base Security Battalion, and the 1281st Military Police Company.

MOVEMENTS OF THE 51ST WING AND ITS UNITS

4. The 4th Squadron moved from CATANIA to FONTE CLIVO on 29 February to rejoin the 62nd Group. On 12 February, an advanced air echelon of Headquarters, 62nd Group and the 7th and 51st Squadrons moved to BRINDISI in the boot of ITALY. These units remained there in connection with BALKAN operations until approx-



Locations of
Troop Carrier Units
in Italy and Sicily
1944

imately 28 March, when they returned to PONTE OLIVO. The 60th Group and its four Squadrons, the 10th, 11th, 12th and 28th, moved to BRINDISI at the end of March, taking up the work of its predecessors, the 7th and 51st Squadrons, and remained there until October when they all moved to FOMIGLIANO.

5. The Air Echelon of the 18th Squadron returned from EL AOUINA to PONTE OLIVO on 1 April, just in time to repack and leave for the Southeast Asia Command on 3 April, along with the air echelons of the entire 64th Group, plus that of the 4th Squadron, 62nd Group.

6. The 7th of May saw the 62nd Group in its entirety (minus the air echelon, 4th Squadron) move from PONTE OLIVO, SICILY, to GAUDO Airfield, ITALY. Around the middle of June, the 64th Group and its units returned to COMISO, SICILY; and the 4th Squadron joined the 62nd Group at GAUDO Airfield.

7. With the beginning of summer, all units of the 51st Wing began congregating in the ROME area, save the 60th Group which remained at BRINDISI. Wing headquarters and the five service units moved to LIDO DI ROMA on 29 June, the 62nd Group moved from GAUDO to GALERA Airfield on 29 June, and the 64th Group moved from COMISO, SICILY to CIAMPINO Airfield around 10 July. At the same time the 51st Troop Carrier Wing Glider Training Center, which had been organized on 17 May at PONTE OLIVO in preparation for Operation 'Dragoon', moved to MARCIGLIANO, where it was shortly redesignated the Glider Training Base. Thereafter it moved to the airfield at GUIDONIA, also in the ROME Area.

8. During the early part of September, the 16th, 17th, 18th and 35th Squadrons of the 64th Group were moved to ISTRES LE TUBE, FRANCE. The 16th and 35th Squadrons returned to CIAMPINO on 11 October, and the 17th and 18th Squadrons did not return to CIAMPINO until 11 November.

9. Headquarters, 62nd Group, and the 4th and 8th Squadrons moved to MALIGNANO Airfield the end of September, while the 51st Squadron was sent to FOGGIA MAIN Airfield in Southern ITALY. On 22 October, the 7th Squadron moved from GALERA to BRINDISI and was followed on 27 October by the 51st Squadron coming to the same field. Early in October, the 60th Group and the 11th, 12th and 28th Squadrons moved from BRINDISI to FOMIGLIANO, leaving the 10th Squadron behind to follow up on 22 October. Early in December, the 7th Squadron left the 51st Squadron at BRINDISI and moved to TARQUINA Airfield.

II. BALKAN OPERATIONS

PLANNING AND PHASING

10. The only tactical operations undertaken by Troop Carrier which lasted without break throughout 1944 were the operations in support of partisan forces within enemy-held territory. These operations consisted primarily of dropping supplies, but included also dropping of personnel, landing of supplies and personnel, nickeling, and evacuation of personnel.

11. Planning and Liaison. Planning for the operation discussed at this point was carried out by the British, and all liaison with the various partisan groups was handled by them. The Troop Carrier units involved simply carried out the instructions passed down to them by 334 Wing, RAF, to whom they were attached for operational control. 334 Wing, itself, planned the missions in accordance with the desires of various higher planning echelons, which included 'A' Force, No. 1 Force, Force 266, I.S.L.D. and C.S.S. After 1 June 1944 when the Balkan Air Force was formed, the Troop Carrier units came under its operational jurisdiction though remaining attached to 334 Wing as before.

12. Scope of the Operations. 334 Wing, which was operating with a mixed allotment of Halifaxes, Wellingtons, and Liberators, conducted operations as far afield as CRETE, FRANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, and ROMANIA, though many of those missions were solely for the purpose of dropping nickels at the request of partisan groups within those countries. However, the great bulk of the missions went to ITALY, JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, and GREECE; and it was in these that the Troop Carrier units played their part. The emphasis after the first phase was so predominantly on JUGOSLAVIA that the name of BALKAN Operations came to be applied to all of these operations performed with 334 Wing. Consequently, they are treated herein separately from the aid to partisan groups in Northern ITALY which began late in 1944 under quite different lines of operational control.

13. Units Participating. The first Troop Carrier unit to participate in these operations was the 8th Squadron of the 62nd Group which was moved to GIOIA DEL COLLE for the purpose and flew its first mission in this operation on 8 December 1943. In February, two more squadrons of the 62nd Group, the 7th and 51st, moved to BRINDISI to join the operation. Their first mission was flown on 12 February. These three squadrons continued this work throughout February and March, at the end of which they returned to their original SICILIAN bases, being replaced on 1 April by the entire 60th Group, all of which had moved to BRINDISI for this purpose. Operations were continued by the 60th Group until the 22nd of October when the 7th and 51st Squadrons again took over.

14. Phases. The operations in the initial stage consisted primarily of dropping supplies within ITALY, itself, to escape parties, Allied missions north of the lines and to 8th Army troops cut off in the hills from other sources of supply.

15. Starting with 12 February, a shift of emphasis occurred along with the stepping up of operations. Drops continued to be made in ITALY, but by far the bulk of supplies were now flown to the aid of the partisans in JUGOSLAVIA.

16. In the third stage, beginning with 1 April, when the 60th Group took over, missions to JUGOSLAVIA were enormously increased, more and more landings were made, and the scope of operations was widened to include not only Northern ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA, but also ALBANIA, GREECE, HUNGARY, and BULGARIA.

17. The fourth period, which began in October when the 7th and 51st Squadrons took over from the 60th Group, was a continuation of the same type of operations, but marked a considerable diminution of the entire effort.

THE INITIAL PERIOD

18. Types of Operations. The 8th Troop Carrier Squadron took part in two distinct types of operations;

- a. The first was a series of drops in support of escape parties and Allied Missions north of the lines in ITALY. These were all night operations, and all save one were within ITALY. One mission was flown to JUGOSLAVIA. These missions were flown during the period 8 December 1943 through 14 February 1944.

- b. The second operation was a series of daylight missions to drop supplies to units of the 8th Army who were cut off in the hills from other sources of supplies. These missions were flown during the period 7 January through 22 February 1944.

19. Summary. Most of these missions were flown with fighter escort. Night flights were rendered peculiarly difficult because in most cases no signals or lights from the ground were available as guides, and the drops had to be made 'blind'. However, as is shown in the following statistics, weather was the greatest single obstacle to the operations:

SUMMARY OF NIGHT OPERATIONS:

Number of Sorties	32
(a) Successful	18
(b) Unsuccessful (due to weather)	14
Weight of supplies, Containers, Chutes dropped	
(a) Gross	56,920
(b) Net	49,600
(c) Breakdown	
(1) Supplies (food, clothing, medical, etc.)	44,000
(2) Containers, chutes	7,320
Personnel dropped (28 men)	5,600 lbs.

SUMMARY OF DAYLIGHT OPERATIONS:

Number of Sorties	42
(a) Successful	38
(b) Unsuccessful	4
Weight of Supplies, Containers, Chutes dropped	
(a) Gross	124,000
(b) Net	106,310
(c) Breakdown	
(1) Supplies (food and medical)	106,310
(2) Containers and chutes	17,690

Reasons for failures:

	<u>Nos.</u>
(a) Weather	3
(b) Technical failures	1

20. This shows that in spite of the extremely poor flying weather, this one squadron in a period of a little over two months was able to complete 56 sorties out of 74 attempted, in the course of which 155,910 net pounds were dropped, including the 28 men.

21. Losses Incurred. This record was accomplished with the loss of only one plane, which was carrying a crew of five men plus one observer. It was unfortunate that one of the men so lost was Lt. Col. Nowotny, Commanding Officer of the Squadron.

THE SECOND PERIOD


22. Units Participating. For the period from 12 February through 28/29 March 1944, this work was taken over by the 7th and 51st Squadrons. The 8th Squadron ceased to work on these operations as such after 22 February. However, five planes and their crews were placed on DS with the 7th and 51st and continued to fly with them throughout the period.

23. Daylight Missions. Daylight missions were practically abandoned in this period, only two being flown and both of those with fighter escort.

a. One was a single-plane mission flown within ITALY.

b. The second was interesting in that it was an isolated example of a glider tow in these operations. Known as Mission 'MANHOLE', it was flown on 23 February, and consisted of a three-plane tow carried out by the 51st Squadron.

24. Mission 'Manhole'. Twenty-two British and six Russian officers were carried in three CG-4A's. In addition, the aircraft carried an additional internal load of 10,500 gross pounds, 7,700 net pounds of medical supplies, rations, clothing and baggage.



ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΝ ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ

(ΑΠ' ΕΞΕΛΑΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΤΑΓΜΕΤΕΛΕΣ,
ΤΗΣ 1ης ΙΑΝΟΥΑΡΙΟΥ 1944)

Ἡ ἔκκλησις περὶ ἐνοτήτος τοῦ ἔθνους τὴν ὁποίαν ἀπηύθυνε χθὲς βράδυ ὁ πρωθυπουργὸς τῆς Ἑλλάδος κ. Τσουδερός καὶ εὐγλωττος εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἐπὶκαιρος. Ὁ κ. Τσουδερός εἶναι Κρής, βλαστὸς τοῦ γενναίου καὶ ἀνυποτάκτου ἐκείνου νησιωτικοῦ λαοῦ, ὅστις εὐσέθῃ πάντοτε εἰς τὴν πρώτην γραμμὴν τοῦ ἔθνικου ἀγώνος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀπὸ πάσης ξένης ἢ ἐσωτερικῆς τυραννίας. Ἡ προσιδοποίησίς του περὶ τῶν κινδύνων τοῦ δινασμοῦ στηρίζεται ἐπὶ βαθείας συμπαθείας πρὸς τοὺς πάσχοντας συμπατριώτας του καὶ πλήρους κατανόησεως τῆς ἱστορίας των, τῶν κατορθωμάτων καὶ ἀδυναμιῶν των. Ἐκαμὲ ἔκκλησιν εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, τὴν κοῖσιν καὶ τὴν νομιμοφροσύνην των πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς Συμμάχους τῆς. Τὰ μηνύματα τῶν κ.κ. Ἡντεν καὶ Κερντέλ Χάλ, τὰ ὁποῖα ἀνέγνωσε εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐκκλησεως του εἶναι ἄξια τῆς ἀμερίστου προσοχῆς τῶν ἀκροατῶν τοῦ. Ἀμφότεροί οἱ πολιτικοὶ συνιστοῦν τὴν ἀναβίωσιν τῆς ἐνότητος προσπαθείας καὶ σκοποῦ ποῦ διέπνεε τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἀντίστασιν ἕως ἐσχάτως. Κατὰ τρόπον ὡμὸν (ὑπάρχουν δὲ περιστάσεις ποῦ τὸ τάκτ' δὲν ἔχει θέσιν) ὁ κ. Χάλ λέγει ὅτι ἡ εἰδη-

σις περὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοκτονικοῦ σπαραγμοῦ ἐντὸς τῆς Ἑλλάδος «ἠκούσθη δυσαρέστως παρὰ τῆς ἀμερικανικῆς Κυβερνήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἀμερικανικοῦ λαοῦ». Ὁ ἐσωτερικὸς διχασμὸς ἀποτελεῖ κίνδυνον εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἀντίστασιν καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ἐλπίδας διὰ τὸ μέλλον. Αἱ περιστάσεις ἀπαιτοῦν πύκνωσιν τῶν τάξεων καὶ ἐνιαῖον μέτωπον.

Ἡ ἔκκλησις ἦτο ἀκομὴ περισσότερον ἀναγκαῖα τῶρα ποῦ τὰ Ἠνωμένα Ἔθνη ἐτοιμάζονται νὰ ὀρμήσουν κατὰ τοῦ γερμανικοῦ «Εὐρωπαϊκοῦ Φρουρίου», ἡ ἀποφασισμένη φρουρὰ τοῦ ὁποῦ σχεδιάζει τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ ἐξόντωσιν τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν φίλων των. Δὲν εἶνε τῶρα καιρὸς δι' ἀδελφοκτόνους ἐρίδας ποῦ κατασπαταλοῦν τὴν δραστηριότητα προξενούσαι ἀντιπερισπασμὸν εἰς τὰς προσπάθειας τῶν ἀνταρτικῶν ὁμάδων, ποῦ φέρουσιν τὴν ἀπογοήτευσιν εἰς τοὺς μετριοπαθεστέρους Ἑλληνας τοῦ ἐσωτερικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐξωτερικοῦ καὶ μαραινοῦν τὰς ἐλπίδας των. Ὅταν λάβει κανεὶς ὑπ' ὄψιν τοὺς πείναν καὶ τὰς σφαγὰς, τὰς πιέσεις καὶ τὴν ἀντίστασιν, αἱ προσωπικαὶ ἀντιζηλῖαι καὶ φιλοδοξίαι μονοπωλήσεως ἐκείνων ποῦ διὰ τοῦ ἐσωτερικοῦ σπαραγμοῦ θὰ ἔθεταν εἰς κίνδυνον τὸν ἔθνικόν λυτρωμόν, ἀποτελοῦν παραφωνία εἰς τὸ ἔθνικόν ἔπος. Αἱ δικαιολογίαι τὰς ὁποίας ὁ Βύρων εὐρε-

Sample copy of the type of
Nickel dropped over GREECE

25. The mission was from BARI to the drop zone at MEDENO POLJR, about ten kilometres west of PETROVAC BOZANSKI, JUGO-SLAVIA. (44° 34' 20" N, 16° 16' 40" E). Escort was provided by twenty-four F-40's. Visibility was good to within twenty miles of the target, but from there on the cover was 10/10. After some circling, a break in the overcast revealed the sought-for runway and the identifying fires. The gliders were released at 5,000 feet, and the bundles were then dropped in two and three runs over the target area from altitudes of 3,500 and 4,500 feet. No type of enemy action occurred, and the mission was later verified as 100% successful.

26. Night Missions. Unescorted night missions were set within this period as the normal operating procedure, and for the first time the bulk of the missions were flown to JUGOSLAVIA. Missions were still carried out behind the enemy lines in ITALY, but to a lesser extent, and in addition ALBANIA and GREECE were added to the territory being served. As early as the night of 22/23 February, one plane flew a mission into the PATRAS area of GREECE, in which 4,500 pounds of nickels were dropped.

27. Causes for Sortie Failures. Weather was again a controlling factor. Out of 190 sorties, 62 were unsuccessful due to this one cause. The second cause for failures lay in lack of reception from the ground, frequently the result of enemy action, wrong signals, or incorrect ground-to-air letter. These causes combined accounted for about 42 unsuccessful sorties. Only three sorties failed through technical failures. However, these various factors added up to 106 2/3 sortie failures out of 190 attempted.

28. Summary Statistics for the Second period. In spite of these difficulties, the 7th and 51st Squadrons were able to roll up a considerable increase in the amount of successful work accomplished. The following table shows their totals for this entire period.

COMBINED REPORT - 7TH AND 51ST SQUADRONS

Number of Sorties	190
(a) Successful	83 1/2
(b) Unsuccessful	106 2/3
Weight of Stores, Nickels, Personnel dropped	
(a) Gross	374,900
(b) Net	270,194

(c) Breakdown

(1) Gross weight of stores	345,569
(2) Net weight of stores	240,863
(3) Personnel (56 men)	11,200
(4) Weight of Nickels	18,131

Reasons for Failures: -

(a) Weather	<u>No.</u> 61 5/6
(b) No reception	25 1/2
(c) Wrong signals	14 1/3
(d) Technical failures	3
(e) Incorrect ground-to-air letter	2
	<hr/>
<u>TOTAL</u>	106 2/3

(No reception frequently result
of enemy action against ground
forces.)

29. Losses. Within this period, the above results were accomplished with no losses of either aircraft or personnel.

TACTICS


30. The Pattern Set. Within this second period, the general tactics of night drops over enemy-occupied country were worked out by these squadrons of the 62nd Group, and with the exception of increased use of navigational aids, remained substantially the same in the later periods.

31. Personnel and Freight Carried. The assignment called for the dropping of stores, paratroops (Joes) and other personnel, propaganda leaflets (nickels) and the one glider mission already described. The stores to be dropped consisted for the most part of high explosives, bombs, rifles, Bren guns, mortars, gold, food, clothing, rations, medical supplies, and other supplies essential to equip fighting forces, saboteurs, and rescue organizations. These stores were carried not only as internal loading to be kicked out through the loading doors, but also in externally carried containers.

32. Target Locations. The targets in the BALKAN countries were situated almost exclusively in low-lying areas of mountainous regions. This necessitated going into the target at a high altitude, then letting down over the pin-point into what is best described as a bowl. At times this proved difficult and was always dangerous, particularly where clouds partly covered the target, as was frequently the case.



A typical drop zone, located in the mountainous regions of the BALKANS. Photograph shows signal fires burning to designate drop zones.



Identified by flare pots and signal
fires, Landing Zones have rough run-
ways, mountainous surroundings.

33. Target Identification. The briefing for these operations called for making landfall on the BALKAN coast between 6,000 and 10,000 feet; DR to the target area, circle - at the same time flashing a pre-arranged letter of the day from the aircraft. Upon seeing the letter, the ground forces proceeded to light a set of fires (usually representing a letter of the alphabet), then flashed a different ground-to-air letter in answer to the aircraft. Thus, three conditions were essential to the drop: (a) The pilot must be over the pin-point; (b) Must recognize the signal fires as briefed; (c) Must receive the correct letter of the day from the ground.

34. More frequently than not, the signal fires on the ground were already lighted when the aircraft approached the target area and thus served as a valuable navigational aid. It sometimes happened, however, that the receiving party was surrounded by the enemy or in imminent danger of being detected, so that the fires could not safely be lighted until the aircraft was heard and had identified itself. Not infrequently, the enemy discovered the ground forces just before, during or after the fires were lighted, chasing them from the area. In such cases, the missions were necessarily unsuccessful, for, although the fires might be properly lighted, and taken over, the ground-to-air letter would not be forthcoming. This factor frequently saved the stores from falling into enemy hands.

35. Nickeling. The dropping of nickels over heavily populated areas of ITALY and the BALKANS was accomplished on some nights when weather conditions made supply drops impossible. Nickeling could be done by dead-reckoning alone. Thus, in many instances where stores were not dropped, nickels were. Exclusive nickeling missions were all successful. Small parcels of nickels were usually taken along on supply drops and thrown out of the aircraft while over large cities en route to, or returning from, the target.

36. Flying Time. During this second period, the average length of flight per sortie was $4 \frac{1}{2}$ hours. In a few instances it was necessary to "Sweat Out" daylight over the ADRIATIC SEA, but there were no incidents. Where-ever possible, all ships were to be over friendly territory by or before daylight, the ADRIATIC SEA being considered such. The longest flight covered 8 hours and 30 minutes; the second longest, 8 hours and 05 minutes; and the longest period of instrument flying (without a break) was five hours.

THE MATTOCK

THE PEASANT'S NEWSPAPER

The peasant's mattock will dig the grave for nazism and fascism

HOW TO DRIVE OUT THE GERMANS

THE Germans with the help of the Fascist, are methodically organising the pillage of our lands. We know this for a fact. They have done the same, sooner or later, wherever they have been: from Russia to Sicily, from France to the Balkans. They and their Fascist accomplices in every village and in every farm, in every house, threaten to steal everything down to the last grain of corn, down to the last head of livestock. But you the peasants, can and must defend the fruits of your toil. You must hide as much of your grain as you can before it is too late, and preserve them for your families, and for the Italians living in the towns where the spectre of famine has already made its appearance. Preserve them for your comrades who are trying to escape from German slavery.

BURY YOUR STOCKS OF FOOD

Get hold of demijohns, barrels, tins and flasks. Wash them and let them dry. Fill them with grain, with flour, with dried vegetables,

with rice, and with oil. Close these receptacles up carefully, and seal them if possible with wax or greases. Then bury them. Many other food stuffs, from potatoes to wine, can be preserved for long periods of time underground in this way. Remember, however; to bury them so deep that the frost cannot get at them and spoil them.

DO NOT LET YOUR LIVESTOCK BE REQUISITIONED

Slaughter it rather in secret: the flesh of oxen, of horses, and of sheep, can be preserved for a long time in the same way as that of pigs. The ribs, the shoulders, the fillets, cut into small pieces, can be salted and dried and cooked over a fire of green wood. The peasants of the Alpine valleys do this. All meat, particularly in winter, can be preserved in vinegar, in wine, or with salt.

We repeat: Hide, hide everything, distribute your food stuffs in different hiding places.

Do not be taken in if you are offered high prices for requisitioned goods. Mussolini's lire and Hitler's marks will be worth nothing at the end of the war. The Germans

may offer you sterling or dollars, because they know that you expect the arrival of English and American troops together with Italian soldiers. Be careful: such sterling and dollars have been stolen and will be cancelled and withdrawn from circulation.

BUT IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEND ONESELF

You peasants must help by any means you can to drive the Germans out of Italy. One thousand means, not dangerous, are at your disposal. Make everything that is stolen or requisitioned, so that it cannot be used or enjoyed by the Germans. Spread pieces of glass and nails along the roads that the German cars travel. If it is in the cold season, let some water flow along the roads so that ice will form on these roads. Cut and take off the wires of the German telephonic and telegraphic lines. If there are some mail boxes reserved for the Germans, pour water in them which will cancel the addresses of the correspondence. Set fire to their stocks, stores, billets, or anything belonging to the Germans.

Translation of the type of Nickel dropped over
the BALKAN countries

37. The time allotted for 'stooging' around the target area, pin-pointing, waiting for fires to be lighted and making the necessary runs was one hour. However, when the ground forces did not answer, or when other conditions prevented a ready drop, this time was frequently extended, sometimes by more than an additional hour. Almost without exception, pilots were given an alternate target, and when it became evident that a drop could not be made at the primary target, the pilot, if possible, flew on to his secondary target and tried to drop his load there. It is of interest that on several occasions pilots, before leaving the target, signalled to the ground asking if the drop was "OK", and received "Thank you" in reply.

38. Flak and Searchlights. While aircraft frequently observed flak and searchlights over the BALKANS and ITALY, only a few were actually struck by flak. Searchlights, for reasons unknown, were in all cases extinguished after holding the planes for brief periods. No enemy fighters were encountered.

39. Navigational Aids. In some areas, particularly around BELGRADE, pilots were able to 'home' to the target area on enemy radio stations. Navigational aids to the target were virtually nil. Snow invariably covered mountains and valleys. After reaching the BALKAN coast, pilotage and dead-reckoning were used exclusively.

40. Jettisoning. Despite exigencies which in earlier years would demand the jettisoning of containers and internal loads, only two aircraft found it necessary to jettison their containers at sea: One after an engine had cut out and the plane was losing altitude at the rate of 600 feet a minute; the other when gasoline was running low while flying in instrument weather. Not a single aircraft jettisoned its internal load, including the two just mentioned.

41. Reports from the Partisans. Reports coming from the field were frank and unequivocal. If a bad drop was made, it was reported in no uncertain terms. Fortunately, the critical ones were few. The good ones were greeted with lavish praise: "Congratulations to pilot on magnificent drop; almost put out fires", is one example of the latter type.

THE THIRD PERIOD

42. Units Participating. The third period, lasting from 1 April through 22 October 1944, was marked by the movement of the

entire 60th Group to BRINDISI in relief of the 7th and 51st Squadrons which returned to SICILY. The recognized success and importance of the operation as a whole was clearly marked by the consistent doubling in the number of units and aircraft allotted to the job.

43. Increase in Effort. The 60th Group was able, however, to far more than double the record set by the previous squadrons. Certainly, weather, which became increasingly better, played a most important part in the new records; but changes in tactics, increased familiarity with the job, and better liaison showed a general reduction in all classes of causes for failures. The mounting tempo of these BALKAN operations is indicated in the following tables, which carry the figures through June, the peak month in total performance.

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>
Commitments of Aircraft	677	1141	1021
Total number of Sorties	421	854	939
Successful Sorties	234	548	732
Uncompleted Sorties	187	306	207
% of Sorties completed	55.5%	64.1	77.95

CAUSES OF UNCOMPLETED SORTIES

Weather en route	51	66	28
Percentage of Total	12.11%	7.73%	3.0%
Weather at Target	51	113	92
Percentage of Total	12.11%	13.23%	9.8%
Wrong Signals	30	27	15
Percentage of Total	7.12%	3.16%	1.6%
No Reception	47	50	56
Percentage of Total	11.16%	5.86%	5.9%
Technical	4	12	6
Percentage of Total	.95%	1.38%	.7%
Enemy Action	4		2
Percentage of Total	.95%		.2%
Navigational Error		17	6
Percentage of Total		1.99%	.7%
Recall		15	
Percentage of Total		1.76%	
Missing		2	1
Percentage of Total		.23%	.1%
Other Causes		4	1
Percentage of Total		.46%	.1%

SUMMARY OF STORES DROPPED

	April	May	June
Net weight (lbs)	713,423	1,705,180	2,455,668
Gross weight (lbs)	1,084,757	2,441,775	3,224,653
Joes	48	146	117
Nickels (lbs)	134,056	113,850	134,800
Landings made	8	50	116
Freight evacuated	?	11,200	5,300
Persons evacuated	165	1,061	1,902

44. Numbers of Sortie and Targets. Night missions in this period became the almost invariable rule. The number of planes sent out on each night that missions were flown averaged about thirty-five over the entire period. While very occasionally as few as four went out, at times the number rose to almost fifty. Targets for these missions averaged around fifteen per night, but on one occasion, twenty-two different targets had drops made to them on the same night. Of necessity under these conditions, the number of aircraft making a drop over the same target on the same night was very limited. To the vast majority of them only one or two aircraft were allotted. Almost every night, however, some one or two targets were singled out for special attention, and from four or five up to twelve aircraft made drops in that particular zone.

45. Crew and weight carried. Each of these planes carried a normal crew of six men: pilot, co-pilot, navigator, aerial engineer, radio operator, and a dispatcher (British). Sometimes an additional assistant aerial engineer was carried to assist in discharging the cargo. The weight of stores carried by each plane ranged usually between 3,000 and 4,000 net pounds. On occasion, it reached as high as 4,500 net pounds. In addition, each ship usually carried 150 pounds of nickels which were dropped over specified areas.

46. Loading Procedure. The stores carried continued to be much the type as in the previous period: guns, ammunition, dynamite, food, clothing, medical supplies, and specialized equipment. However, gasoline, oil, jeeps, radios, mail and mules were added at this time. With the constant demand coming in for all sorts of material, a packing station was set up at BRINDISI which was the source of supply for all BALKAN missions. Material was stored according to type, such as arms and ammunition; food;

clothing; medical supplies, high explosives, etc. "Standard packs" were always kept on hand; and when special requests were received which could not be filled by "Standard packs" the items were packed and stored to await the first sorties to that particular area.

47. The Air Loads Section was always kept fully informed as to the needs and requirements of the partisans. A maximum load list was prepared for each aircraft and given to a checker who then took a truck and made a tour of the various storehouses in order to fill his list. Partisans (who had been brought to ITALY for medical care, in most instances) loaded the truck with the necessary containers and bundles, a stop was made at the Post Office for mail, another stop at the Parachute Shed, and finally the truck went to the Airdrome with a complete load for one aircraft.


48. The truck then reported to the Loads Control Hut which was run by a Warrant Officer, who had several teams of partisan loaders working under him. Information was given as to which aircraft was to ferry the load, and a team of loaders boarded the truck to go out to the plane and transfer the load. At the same time, the British checker in charge of the team inspected and checked the load to ensure that it was correct. While partisan crews did all of the packing, the final checking of the load was done by the crew chief.

49. On occasions when the ships were required to carry mules, special preparations were necessary in order to enable the aircraft to carry such a load with all possible safety. Tarpaulin was first put down on the floor of the ship and then covered by a temporary floor of wooden planks. Cross supports of 2" poles were placed securely across the interior of the cabin in such a position as to be to the front and rear of each animal. Another 2" pole was placed across the center of the first poles perpendicularly and lashed to each cross piece. In this manner, four mules could be transported in each aircraft. Mules were then loaded onto the planes and tied down securely from the pack saddle to strong points in the cabin and to the cross supports. Upon completion of a "mule-hauling mission", the Engineering Section then had to remove all of the material for its next tactical mission.


50. In instances where Joes (persons who are infiltrated into the enemy or enemy-occupied territory) were transported, they had to be dressed and checked thoroughly for equipment a good half an hour before boarding the plane. Sometimes only one Joe was carried, but as many as fifteen have been carried in one ship.




Packed entirely according to requests from field, containers contain no unnecessary items; no waste space. Each is packed carefully to avoid breakage.



Mules loaded on a C-47, ready to be flown to the partisans.



Bundles and packages make up internal load. Packages are lowered by parachute; bundles merely thrown from aircraft. Packages colored red contain mail. Parachute static lines are attached before take-off.



Shortly before dropping target is reached,
packages are placed ready for dropping.
Eight or ten packages are dropped at each
pass over the target.



Signal light turns green as D.Z. is reached.
Crew Chief dispatches containers first;
packages follow in successive passes.



When nickelling target is reached, Crew Chief splits bundles and throws nickels into slip stream to be scattered.



Paratroops' D.Z. may be same as for containers or several miles distant. Pilot gives warning signal upon approach; jump signal when over target.

51. Finally, with all necessary equipment loaded on the aircraft, either in packs in the ship or in canisters slung in racks under the belly of the ship, last minute checks and briefing having been made, the aircraft was ready to be on its way for its appointed destination.

52. Nickeling. The number of exclusively nickeling missions dropped almost to zero. In April seven sorties were flown purely for the purpose of dropping propaganda leaflets. In May and June only one sortie in each month was devoted exclusively to this purpose, and only two in July. While the total poundage in nickels dropped each month remained fairly level, and in June even surpassed the April total, it was carried out as a regular side-issue of the supply drops.

53. Landings. One important new element was added to the operation. For the first time, landings were made within the partisan-held territory of JUGOSLAVIA. The limited size and difficulties in approach and take-off from these small and secret air-strips in addition to the mountainous terrain and the dangers involved in night landings on temporary air-strips made this an unusually hazardous undertaking. Enemy night fighters lurking in the area also added danger to the tasks of these unarmed, unarmoured, and unescorted transports. However, the number of these landings accomplished rose from about 8 in the month of April to 116 in June, and all such landings were completed without loss in either personnel or planes. Moreover, as the partisans progressed and held better territory, these landings continued to increase in number.


54. Landings served a dual purpose. They permitted the Group to recover for re-use large numbers of containers and parachutes used in dropping the supplies, and they also permitted the evacuation of personnel. The personnel were for the greater part partisans, frequently wounded. Partisans contended that the evacuation of one of their wounded released four other partisans for battle. However, the evacuees also included Italian soldiers and British and American air crews who had been forced down over the BALKANS. The usual number evacuated per landing averaged around twenty, but numbers up to thirty were not uncommon. On the night of 14/15 May, twenty-six partisans and a British General were evacuated. On the night of 29/30 May, thirty American flyers were brought out safely. In the month of June alone, 1902 persons were evacuated, along with 5,300 pounds of freight, largely parachutes and containers. The first mass evacuation was carried out on 10 August in a daylight mission. C-47's, escorted by P-51's, flew to an air-strip 140 miles inside of German-held JUGOSLAVIA and



A Group of partisans just
before boarding a C-47 to
be evacuated to ITALY.



At destination, passengers disembark;
wounded are taken to hospitals.
Mission is complete.



A handful of the 500-odd
children who have been
evacuated from the BALKANS.

evacuated 226 American air crew members successfully. On 22 August 705 wounded partisans and 16 Allied air crewmen were evacuated, which was the largest evacuation ever accomplished during these operations. But, these were not the only evacuees, for children and women were brought out as well. One plane alone brought out sixty-six children and three nurses, the largest number of persons ever carried by a single plane in these operations.

55. Scope of the Operations. By far the greater number of missions were flown to JUGOSLAVIA, but drops were also made regularly throughout this period in ITALY, GREECE and ALBANIA. Fewest of all were made within ITALY. By the end of June, it had become almost purely BALKAN operations, and remained that way to the end of the year

56. In spite of the continually increasing number of sorties being flown, and the impressive amount accomplished the losses remained very light. Two aircraft were lost in April, but the entire crew of one was saved. The plane in question was forced through weather and engine failure to ditch in the ADRIATIC. Of the personnel, three received injuries in the process. Again in May, two aircraft, this time with the entire crews, were lost. In June, only one plane with its crew was lost. Two planes were lost during July, one crew being entirely safe, while only the co-pilot escaped from the second ship, and the other four members of the crew went down with the plane. The aircraft in question was lost because of enemy night fighter action when the gasoline tanks were hit and burst into flames. Two more planes were lost in August and a tenth in September, but the crews of all three were safe. The loss of ten planes, and twenty-eight men pointed up the hazards involved, but it remained a small loss in view of the amount accomplished.

57. Relative Importance of the American Participation. In spite of the fact that the BALKAN operations were carried on under purely British supervision, they became an almost international effort. In July, Russian and Italian aircraft joined the effort, and the Italians continued to contribute materially thereafter. The Troop Carrier participation, however, continued to bulk as the larger part of the over-all operations. The following table indicates the comparative extent of their effort in the whole.

58. In this table all non-American units as mentioned above are included under the British figures and a few sorties flown by the 68th Tactical Reconnaissance Group are included under American. The figures are taken from monthly summaries published by 334 Wing, and are here given for only the months from May through August, the peak months of this BALKAN resupply activity. Tons referred to are British long tons, equal to 2,200 pounds.

		May	June	July	August
Successful Sorties	American	570	766	621	604
	British	362	466	607 $\frac{1}{2}$	413
	Total	932	1232	1228 $\frac{1}{2}$	1017
Unsuccessful Sorties	American	318	225	237	228
	British	186	206	299 $\frac{1}{2}$	266
	Total	504	431	536 $\frac{1}{2}$	494
Net Tons Delivered	American	787.3	1088.2	928.13	755.8
	British	563	792.2	887.43	552.8
	Total	1350.3	1880.4	1815.56	1308.6
Gross Tons Delivered	American	1056.2	1379.2	1118.81	988.5
	British	808.25	1128	1175.14	701.54
	Total	1864.45	2507.2	2293.95	1690.04

59. It should be remembered that the percentage of American resupply to JUGOSLAVIA, the key country in these activities, was considerably greater than indicated above, since the British effort was extended into so many more distant countries. Moreover, the vast percentage of landings and evacuations were handled by Troop Carrier. In June, the 60th Group made 116 out of the total of 152 landings made and evacuated 1,898 out of the total of 2,571 persons evacuated.

60. Summary of the Third Period. The complete extent of the work accomplished by the 60th Troop Carrier Group during its participation in the BALKAN operations is shown in the following table.

	: April -	:	:	:	:
	: July	: August	: September	: October	: Total
MISSIONS				17	
Flown	: 3059	: 770	: 568	: 190	: 4587
Successful	: 2136	: 567	: 424	: 180	: 3307
Landing Missions	:	:	:	:	:
Included in	: 387	: 145	: 128	: 81	: 741
Successful Missions:	:	:	:	:	:
Unsuccessful	: 923	: 203	: 144	: 10	: 1280

SUMMARY OF SUCCESSFUL MISSIONS:

Gross pounds	:	:	:	:	:
landed or dropped	: 9,472,693	: 2,321,551	: 1,768,858	: 683,167	: 14,246,269
Net lbs. supplies	:	:	:	:	:
landed or dropped	: 7,003,502	: 1,694,457	: 1,352,470	: 198,406	: 11,248,835
Pounds of nickels	:	:	:	:	:
dropped	: 504,621	: 114,100	: 90,081	: 19,800	: 728,602
Pers. infiltrated	:	:	:	:	:
(landed & dropped)	: 402	: 203	: 232	: 1,739	: 2,576
Personnel	:	:	:	:	:
evacuated	: 5,469	: 2,193	: 1,582	: 78	: 9,322
Pounds freight	:	:	:	:	:
flown out	: 48,150	: 17,545	: 11,903	: -----	: 77,598

SUMMARY OF UNSUCCESSFUL MISSIONS

Weather	: 502	: 77	: 75	: 7	: 661
Wrong signal or	:	:	:	:	:
No Reception	: 336	: 99	: 51	: --	: 486
Mech. Failure	: 34	: 13	: 8	: 3	: 58
Navigational	:	:	:	:	:
Error	: 27	: 10	: 4	: --	: 41
Combat Losses	: 6	: --	: 1	: --	: 7
Enemy Action	: 11	: 4	: 5	: --	: 20
Other Reasons.	: 7	: --	: --	: --	: 7

61. By far the greater part of the persons evacuated as shown above were patients. These were not handled by the Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons, and consequently do not appear in their statistics. The actual numbers are as follows: April - 76; May - 706; June - 1286; July - 1438; August - 1517; September - 1162; Total - 6185.

62. It is impossible to estimate the exact value of an operation such as this, but some indication of the appreciation with which the effort was received is given in the following message received by the 60th Group from Lt. Gen. Eaker on 23 May 1944: -

"I must congratulate you on the great job of work you are doing. Please tell aircrews and ground personnel employed on special operations how very greatly their efforts are appreciated. They are doing it very well. They should know also that General Korniev, the head of the Russian mission with Tito, has just expressed his appreciation of their help to the Partisans, which he has reported to the Soviet Government. Well done all. Keep it going."

THE FOURTH PERIOD

63. Units Participating. The beginning of the fourth period overlaps the third and is marked by the move of the 51st Squadron, 62nd Group, from GALERA to FOGGIA Main on 28/29 September. The Squadron was placed under the operational control of Balkan Air Force and the 334 Wing and in addition under the 60th Group during the 6th, 7th, and 8th of October. Originally, the Squadron had been scheduled for operations in Northern ITALY, but bad weather created a change in plans, and all operations were switched to the BALKANS.

64. The 51st Squadron flew its first BALKAN mission on 11 October, and the next day all ships of the squadron were sent to SAN PANCRAZIO to participate in Operation MANNA. The Squadron planes returned to FOGGIA Main Airfield on 18 October and resumed operations on 20 October. The 51st Squadron was ordered to move to BRINDISI on 27 October, continuing BALKAN operations on the 30th of that month.

65. The air echelon of the 7th Squadron, 62nd Group, was also ordered to SAN PANCRAZIO from GALERA Airfield on 11 October to take part in operation MANNA. On the 19th of the month the air echelon returned to GALERA, only to be moved, with the remainder of the squadron, to BRINDISI on 22 October. BALKAN operations were begun on the 25th of October.

66. Together, these two squadrons formed the Balkan Detachment of the 62nd Troop Carrier Group, commanded by the Commanding Officer of the 51st Squadron. However, the 7th Squadron was ordered to move to TARQUINA Airfield early in December, thus leaving the 51st Squadron to carry on the work alone.

67. Tactics. Since both of these squadrons had done this type of work in the previous spring, they were thoroughly familiar with it. Tactics remained substantially the same, the large majority of sorties being flown at night, without escort, to small landing strips in BALKAN countries. However, several planes were now equipped with the "Sugarphone" which is hooked up to the Intercom and which enabled air crews to talk directly to ground personnel over the target area. By using a "Sugarphone", pilots were able to maneuver to the exact pin-point before dropping their loads, thereby greatly increasing their accuracy. In one particular instance, where one target had two pin-points, both with similar signals, the ground forces directed the pilot to the correct pin-point by "Sugarphone" and so prevented an incorrect drop.

68. Weather conditions. Within this period, November was notable for extremely poor weather conditions, only 14 out of 30 days being operational. However, on occasion flights were risked on what would normally have been non-operational nights. As an example, on the night of 4 November, all missions had been cancelled. However, the 7th Squadron had received an urgent call for supplies and sent 5 planes to Northern JUGOSLAVIA in spite of the weather. Unexpected clear visibility greeted the pilots over the target area and more than 8 ½ tons of supplies, plus one Joe, were dropped successfully.

69. Nickeling. November is also marked by a decided increase in missions flown only for nickeling purposes. Whereas in June and July, the number of these missions dropped to 2 for each month for the entire 60th Group, the 7th and 51st Squadrons raised the figure to 8 for November.

70. Losses. Only one aircraft was lost during this fourth period, and that on the night of 12/13 November by the 51st Squadron. The fate of the plane was learned on 5 December when the sole survivor, A. Dovzak, the JUGOSLAV dispatcher on the plane, returned. His story, as related in the 51st Squadron report, serves as a good example of the dangers inherent in the operations throughout.

"After bailing out over the Island of RAB, North of ZARA, Dovzak observed aircraft 42-24203 crash and burn at approximately 44° 42' 20" N, and 14° 51' 40" E, this was at 2130 hours, 12 November 1944. The partially burned WDAGO Form 65-1 of the pilot of 42-24203, was picked up at the scene of the crash by an unnamed Partisan woman and given to the dispatcher who returned it to the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron.

"Due to adverse weather the target was not located and the plane was on its way back and the crew and Dovzak had just finished having coffee in the companionway. Dovzak went back into the cabin alone. Shortly thereafter, the plane was pulled sharply upward and then seemed to settle back to level flight. Following this the bail-out bell began to ring and the dispatcher noticed fire or light of some kind on the right engine or wing, he was not sure which. At that time the plane fell off to the right, making it necessary for the dispatcher to pull himself upwards to get out of the door. By the time his chute opened, the plane had crashed and started to burn. Crash occurred on the southeastern tip of the island of RAB. 44° 42' 20" N, and 14° 51' 40" E, at about 2130 hours, 12 November 1944. Dovzak landed about 150 yards off-shore and half a mile north of the crash. He swam to shore, hid his chute and made his way to a hill about a mile distant. From the top of this hill he could see figures with flashlights around the wreck. He took these to be Germans.

"Dovzak stayed on the Island three days. Partisans informed him that the Germans had searched all homes and questioned the inhabitants. They were looking for a sixth 'American' whom they had seen come down by parachute. They did not suspect Dovzak as he is a Yugoslav. Partisans told Dovzak that the Germans spent two days salvaging what they could of the plane and that the Germans removed five bodies from the wreck and buried them in a nearby ditch. The Partisans asked permission to give the bodies decent burial, but were refused. They told Dovzak that after the Germans left the Island they would re-bury the remains.

"On the third day after the crash the Germans left the area and a Partisan woman found the WDAGO Form No. 65-1 of the pilot, near the ditch in which burial was

made. The WDAGC Form No. 65-1 was given to Dovzak who delivered it to this squadron. It was partly burned at the edges, but was clearly identified as that of the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft.

"Partisans stated to Dovzak that there is a Battery of 20 AA guns at JABLANAC, which is approximately the place where Dovzak bailed out. They also stated that the plane hit the top of a low hill several hundred yards North of where it crashed and 'flew into many pieces' when it hit."

71. Summary. The following figures show the work accomplished in the fourth period by the 7th and 51st Squadrons.

	17 Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Successful Sorties	119	208	292	619
Unsuccessful Sorties	46	70	133	249
Total Sorties	165	278	425	868
Gross Weight Delivered (lbs)	314,833	766,000	1,096,000	2,176,833
Nickels (lbs)	13,200	46,000	28,000	87,200
Jobs carried	?	281	233	514
Persons evacuated	23	224	111	358

SUMMARY OF BALKAN OPERATIONS FOR 1944

72. The year 1944 encompassed almost the complete total of Troop Carrier's participation in BALKAN operations. The operations began with the work of a single squadron in December 1943 and they lingered on into 1945 again reduced to a single squadron. In the course of the year a tremendous volume of supplies was delivered to the partisans in a steady stream. In the early stages wrong signals, no reception and navigational errors accounted for considerable numbers of non-effective sorties. By the last quarter of the year these had been reduced to a fraction as shown by the following figures which cover the period of April through December.

CAUSES OF NON-EFFECTIVE SORTIES

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Weather	102	179	120	83	91	70	43	59	103	850
Wrong Sig. & No Reception	77	77	71	111	89	67	8	7	2	527
Enemy Action	4	0	2	12	4	3	1	1	7	34
Mechanical	4	12	6	13	12	9	4	0	2	62
Navigational	0	17	6	3	6	2	0	2	0	36
Other	0	21	2	1	0	4	0	1	1	30
Totals	187	306	207	223	202	155	56	70	133	1539

73. The complete statistics for the four periods of BALKAN operations previously discussed are shown in the following table, demonstrating the volume of work accomplished thereby.

	1st Period	2nd Period	3rd Period	4th Period	Total
Total Sorties	74	190	4587	868	5719
Completed	56	83	3307	619	4065
Sorties					
Incompleted	18	107	1280	249	1654
Sorties					
Gross Tons	90.46	172.78	7123.13	1088.41	8474.78
Supplies					
Tons of Nickels	--	9.06	364.3	43.6	416.96
Jobs	--	56	2576	514	3146
Mules	--	--	24	--	24
People Evacuated	--	--	9322	358	9680

III. OPERATIONS IN C.B.I.

INTRODUCTION.

74. The operations of the 64th Troop Carrier Group, plus the 4th Squadron, 62nd Group, under the Southeast Asia Command are included in this history because these units remained assigned to the Twelfth Air Force throughout the operation. Strictly speaking, this section is not a part of the operational history of the Twelfth Air Force, but it is a part of the operational history of Troop Carrier units belonging to the Twelfth and certain reports and documents relative to this operation exist only in this theater.

UNITS PARTICIPATING


75. On 1 April, the 64th Group was notified that an Air echelon of the Group and its four squadrons, plus the Air Echelon of the 4th Squadron, would depart on or about 2 April for the C.B.I. Theater of Operations on DS to the Southeast Asia Command. This Air Echelon comprised 52 aircraft from the Group, plus 12 from the 4th Squadron. Aircraft crews, flight surgeons, the minimum number of staff, maintenance, and clerical personnel necessary to sustain the operation, and essential equipment completed the Echelon.

CAUSE OF THE MOVE

76. As originally planned, the period of DS was to be six weeks in duration and the immediate cause for the operation was the Japanese thrust in the KOHIMA-IMPHAL Sector.

THE ROUTE.

77. Due to the inability of ATC to handle more than eighteen planes a day at certain stations enroute, the Air Echelon departed over the period 2 April through 5 April. The route planned took five days with over-night stops at CAIRO, EGYPT; ABADAN, IRAN; KARACHI, INDIA; GEVA, INDIA; and at LALMAI, the nearest airdrome to COMILLA, INDIA, where the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command, Troop Carrier Command, was located.



LOCATIONS

78. Group Headquarters, and the 16th and 17th Squadrons were based at LALMAI in Lower BENGAL. The 35th Squadron was based at FENNY, in the same area. The 18th Squadron, which was working on a different operation, was located at SOKERATING in Upper ASSAM. The 4th Squadron, through April and into early May, was stationed at FAZELIER in Lower BENGAL. In May it moved up to DINJAN in Upper ASSAM to join in the operations being carried on by the 18th Squadron.

LIVING CONDITIONS

79. Housing. Living conditions, as a whole, were not good, but the difficulties were primarily those inherent in the country itself. In Lower BENGAL the personnel were housed in bashas, bamboo huts with thatched roofs. Up at SOKERATING the personnel, with the exception of the commanding officer who had a basha, lived in RAF desert tents, all of which had concrete floors.

80. Food. The food also varied. The units in BENGAL received British rations supplemented by fresh vegetables. To this, out of mess funds, they were able to add a certain amount of fresh meat and chicken. In ASSAM, the 18th Squadron messed with an ATC outfit. There the food was largely C rations with heavy emphasis on corned beef and cabbage. Fresh meat appeared perhaps once a week, butter never. Sugar was unbleached, and the men complained of finding dirt and string in it. Weevils were found in the cereals. A small Chinese restaurant on the post at SOKERATING, in spite of exorbitant prices, received extensive patronage from the 18th.

81. FX and Entertainment Facilities. FX rations were good. Cigarettes were plentiful, and the ration included twenty-four bottles of American beer per man per month, a fact which the entire Group found impressive. Counterbalancing that as a morale factor, was the fact that no mail was received by the personnel during the entire period of DS. Moreover, there was no entertainment available for the men in BENGAL. Only at SOKERATING was there a motion picture theater on the base for the men.

82. Climate. Climatic conditions created new problems. In Lower BENGAL temperatures ranged up to 125 degrees, day and night, with a humidity of around 85. In Upper ASSAM the temperature reached only around 110 degrees, but the humidity soared to 100%. There was little choice between them. To this was added the drenching monsoon rains, which turned everything to mud.

83. Health Conditions. Disease was prevalent throughout the entire area. In addition to typhus, typhoid, and cholera for which the personnel had received inoculations, malarial fever, boils, dengue fever, and such items as Bengal rot, were a constant danger. In spite of this, illness was kept at a minimum. Salt tablets helped to ward off heat fatigue, though all personnel suffered from that to some degree. Neither quinine nor atabrine were taken, due to the great number of diseases in INDIA which start with a fever, to assist in immediate diagnosis of the ailment. Combat whiskey at the rate of two ounces per combat mission was issued to all flying personnel, and in addition, a jungle ration was obtained through Tenth Air Force Special Services Officer. In view of the fact that the five squadrons flew close to seven thousand sorties in the period, it added up to a goodly amount of whiskey.

84. Combat fatigue was an ever-increasing problem for which little could be done. Occasionally personnel could be spared for a day or two and were allowed to go to CALCUTTA. Sleep at the fields was made restless by the heat plus the unaccustomed presence of jackals, hyenas, spiders, poisonous snakes and all manner of insects.

TACTICS

85. Modification of the Aircraft. Tactics used, and working conditions and schedules, varied widely from anything the Group had previously experienced. The planes were stripped of all excess and much normal equipment in order to increase to a maximum the amount of freight which could be hauled. Among other items, all parachutes and paracocks were discarded. However, for the first time all planes were equipped with two 50 Cal. machine guns.

86. Load and Crew. The load carried varied from 5,500 pounds minimum to 7,000 pounds maximum with a full load of gas. Loads normally consisted of men, ammunition, food, equipment, even mules, with each of which went a Sikh mule-skinner and a truss of hay. Non-fighting personnel, wounded, empty gasoline drums, etc, were regularly evacuated. The standard crew consisted of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, and radio operator. Frequently no co-pilot was carried, and a crew chief was substituted for the navigator. In the later stages, when the routes were more familiar and flying fatigue became a serious problem, navigators often flew as co-pilots, which gave many of the flyers a breathing spell.

87. Supply Drops and Evacuation of Personnel. Flights were made without fighter protection and were flown at contour level. Drops were made from an altitude of 200 feet when parachutes were

used, from tree-top level when the drops were free-fall. Quarter-master men were carried to act as kickers when such drops were made. Wherever possible, landings were made under conditions which will be discussed more fully. It was in the evacuations made from these landing strips that the extremities in load were reached. The Commanding Officer of the Group took thirty-six fully equipped Punjabs out of WANGJING; and another pilot evacuated seventeen litter and thirteen sitting patients out of LALEL.

88. Enemy Air Attacks. A number of aircraft were attacked by the Japs, of which the following incidents are the most interesting:

- a. An aircraft was jumped by two Zeros, and in the ensuing chase, one Zero crashed into the tail of the plane, shearing off all but a foot of the vertical stabilizer. The Zero crashed, but the pilot was successful in bringing his ship back to a friendly base. As a result, he was given credit for downing a Jap Zero.
- b. Another plane was attacked by three Zeros and shot down into the swamp on IMPHAL FLAIN. All of the crew members were wounded, but all were successful in making their way safely to the Allied lines.
- c. Still another plane was attacked by three Zeros, but the pilot was able to escape them through evasive action and brought his ship in successfully to a friendly field. The plane had over a hundred bullet holes in it, and fifteen passengers and the radio operator were wounded, none fatally.
- d. One pilot, by evasive tactics, was able to escape safely from attack by a Zero in spite of the fact that his aileron controls were shot away during the attack. The Zero was seen to crash in the chase, but it could not be substantiated. The pilot thus received credit for a "probable" only.

89. Flight Schedules. In spite of these conditions, the squadrons based in Lower BENGAL flew as many as three round trips a day into the IMPHAL VALLEY. The squadrons in Upper ASSAM, who were supplying General Merrill's Marauders, had a somewhat shorter distance to go. They averaged five round trips a day, lasting from 0600 hours in the morning to as late as 1930 hours in the evening.



At MYITKYINA Airfield, a dead Jap lies where he fell as one C-47 takes off while another burns from a strafing attack by Zeros.

90. Maintenance. In order to maintain these flying schedules, most of the maintenance work had to be done at night. Ground crews frequently worked all night. Fifty and 100 hour inspections never put a ship out of commission. It was ready to fly the next day. Fifty-seven engine changes were made by the Group during this period. The 18th Squadron, in spite of long flying hours, was able to keep 85% of its aircraft in flying condition at all times. These records were maintained in spite of the multitude and variety of insects attracted by the lights of the field generators, in spite of the debilitating heat, and eventually the arrival of the monsoon rains.

UPPER BURMA OPERATIONS

91. Ground situation. The Squadrons located in Upper ASSAM were allocated the job of supplying what were in the opening phase two separate groups: General Stillwell's Chinese forces, which were driving toward MYITKYINA; and General Merrill's "Marauders" in the HUKAWNG VALLEY. In the middle of May these two forces joined. On 17 May, the "Marauders" took the airfield at MYITKYINA, West; and on 18 May, they took MYITKYINA, South. From those dates on, Troop Carrier was operating at those fields.

92. Units Participating. This particular task was handled at first by the 1st, 2nd and 18th Squadrons. The 18th was the only Twelfth Air Force unit involved, and it worked in close cooperation with the 1st Troop Carrier Squadron, which, for instance, handled all of the S-2 work for both squadrons. On 13 May, the 4th Squadron moved north from its former base at FENNY to DINJAN and joined in this Upper BURMA operation, having relatively the same relationship to the 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron that the 18th did to the 1st.

93. Losses. The operations at MYITKYINA were the most dangerous encountered during the entire period of DS. Of the eleven planes lost, seven were lost by the 18th and 4th Squadrons. Moreover an eighth plane, belonging to the 35th Squadron, was lost while on loan to the 2nd and operating out of DINJAN, so it can be included in the number lost in the Upper BURMA operations. All of the men lost were engaged in these missions.

94. Airfields at MYITKYINA. The work at MYITKYINA was divided among the squadrons. The 4th operated in connection with MYITKYINA, West; the 18th with MYITKYINA, South. Circumstances were similar at both fields.

95. Starting on 17 May at MYITKYINA, West, and on 18 May at MYITKYINA, South, both squadrons were landing supplies on the fields and evacuating wounded before the fields were cleared of the Japanese. For a period of three days landings were made while one end of the field remained in Japanese hands. Planes, during landing and takeoff were subjected to machine gun and small-arms fire. The field, itself, was subject to shell-fire from '75's throughout the period.

96. On the first day, crews landed without even wearing helmets as protection. Within a short time thereafter, the air crews were wearing flak-suits as well as helmets. While planes were damaged by this enemy fire, and one plane was shot up so badly on landing as to crash into two other aircraft, ending as a total loss, no casualties occurred among crew members.

97. Bomb craters, mud and water from the heavy rains made the fields additionally hazardous. Most of the planes lost at MYITKYINA were lost in crack-ups due to these conditions. Accidents far beyond the number indicated by lost planes continued unavoidably to occur. Ground crews worked constantly on the damaged aircraft at the MYITKYINA fields, putting them back into flying condition. All of this work had to be carried on while under fire from Jap snipers, and under the conditions of mud, heat, and torrential downpours which applied everywhere.

98. One master sergeant of the 18th had experiences typical of the air crews landing at MYITKYINA:

"I was riding along as radio operator on one of our ships that had landed a load of Chinese troops at MYITKYINA. Upon arrival, I hopped out of the ship and engaged in conversation with an infantry captain, when I heard the warning whine of an approaching Jap '75 shell. The captain was unconcerned and predicted that the shell would be a miss. Well, it was, but the next instant came the chilling sound of another approaching shell and this time the captain said, "Run!" We did. I found a foxhole located under one of the wrecked C-47's on the field. I knew by the sound that the shell was going to land close. It swooshed into the ground not 35 feet away. Overhead the shrapnel from the explosion rained like hail on a tin roof on the fuselage of the ship."

On another occasion when the same sergeant took refuge from Jap shelling in a foxhole, he had an even more unpleasant experience. This time he leaped in hastily, only to land on a Japanese who was not only dead, but highly decayed. The sergeant made an equally precipitous departure.



Men hug the ground after a sniper's bullet pings by.



A crippled C-47 is towed off the runway at MYITKYINA by midget bull-dozer immediately after crash.

99. Weather. To all of the other difficulties' should be added that of weather which was subject to violent and rapid changes. Thunder storms were particularly frequent over the HUKAWNG VALLEY, and it was frequently impossible for pilots to break through to deliver their cargo.

100. Night Missions. Daylight flights were the general rule, but occasional drops were made at night. On 18 May, the first mission flown by the 18th Squadron to assist in the capture of MYITKYINA, South, was a night mission, a drop in this instance; and the pilots were guided to the drop zone by the fires within the town under siege.

101. Summary of 18th Squadron Operation. In spite of these attendant circumstances, some indication of the amount of labor performed in Northern BURMA can be made by comparing the figures for the 18th Squadron with those of all five squadrons as a whole.

	<u>18th Sqdn.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sorties Flown	1,728	6,978
Pounds of Freight	8,738,753	26,233,458
Troops Carried	5,055	35,341

This amounts to almost a quarter of the total number of sorties and close to a third of the total number of pounds of freight carried, although only a seventh of the number of troops.

IMPHAL VALLEY OPERATIONS

102. Ground Situation. The greater part of the operations of the 64th Group was directed toward the support of the IMPHAL VALLEY fighting. The Japanese thrust in the KOHIMA-IMPHAL Sector had disrupted and seriously threatened Allied supply lines to the troops in Northern BURMA. The ground situation was highly confused with both Allied and Japanese units being cut off from any source of supply except by air. There is no question that the supplies carried by the 64th played a major role in erasing this Japanese threat and converting a defensive stand into an Allied drive.

103. Flying conditions. Operations were similar to those in Northern BURMA. Landing strips were short and apt to be covered with mud and water. While no fields in the IMPHAL VALLEY equaled those at MYITKYINA in danger, the crews flying in the IMPHAL Sector were subjected to attacks by Zeros far beyond anything experienced in the North.

104. Freight was handled in the same way, but far greater numbers of troops were carried and more wounded were evacuated. In addition, it was the squadrons working in this area that had the highly unpleasant task of carrying mules. Crews complained that their planes would never smell the same again.

105. Here, as in the North, the great record was that of the ceaseless numbers of sorties flown all day, every day, and day after day. The records show every squadron sending out between seven and nine aircraft every day. One radio operator flew two hundred and forty hours in thirty days with no relief.

106. The following extract from the War Diary of the 17th Troop Carrier Squadron describes a typical mission, this one flown on 13 April, and related by a radio operator:

"Took off at 0810 I.S.T. from LALMAI with load of British Commandos from AMARDA ROAD. Destination, DIMAFUR - a makeshift runway carved through the hills and heavy jungle foliage - surrounded on three sides by the Japs. Noted several Jap trucks while flying over the lines. Runway often unserviceable due to both rain and enemy action. The Japs maintain a force of 150 various aircraft of all types. These have to be replaced monthly as a result of Allied action. British Spitfires and Hurricanes have undisputed control of the air in this area. To date, we have seen no Jap planes. DIMAFUR is a British-held town just behind the lines. We are flying at 7,000 feet - contact over rough, sparsely populated country - occasionally one sees a small farm hewn out of the dense undergrowth. It is not mountainous country, merely the rough foot-hills - the temperature is even quite warm at 7,000 feet and it is only 0830 I.S.T. Arrived DIMAFUR - 0945 I.S.T. - unloaded the Commandos and took on a load of barbed wire for SAFAN up in the IMTHAL Valley - British Major told us that Yesterday they had a hostile aircraft alert with 8 C-47's on the ground - no enemy aircraft showed up - Radio facilities at DIMAFUR deleted - Took off for SAFAN at 1045 I.S.T. SAFAN is another small field in the IMTHAL Valley that is completely surrounded by the Japs - they cause the British no particular worry because here again the "Spits" and "Hurris" control the air. The Japs have all the roads blocked - "Via Air" is the only way in or out of the field. Slow starvation is the process being used on the Jap as the country is too rough for overland transportation, hence no supplies - it's a vicious circle - everyone has everyone else surrounded but no-

body seems worried. Landed at SAFAN at 1145. Unloaded barbed wire and took on a load of tentage for CHANDINA. Took off at 1300, landed CHANDINA at 1430. Unloaded and hit the home trail. Landed at LALMAI at 1520, I.S.T."

Mission completed - - L.S.H.

107. The above mission was typical of the vast majority with one exception. On 25 April, the first ship was lost due to attack by Zeros. Thereafter conditions became more dangerous and there was less tendency to regard the trips as "milk runs".

SUMMARY

108. Period of Operations. The above described operations began on 7 April and were extended beyond the six weeks period originally planned. The Air Echelon did not begin its departure until about 9 June and arrived back in SICILY between 13 and 21 June, having been gone over two and a half months, two of which were spent in actual operation.

109. Summary Statistics. Within this two months period an amazing record was piled up as the following statistics show:

Hours Flown	21,777:20
Sorties Flown	6,978
Troops Carried	35,341
Pounds of Freight	26,233,458
Litter patients evacuated	3,566
Mules transported	390
(6 per A/C plus 6 fully equipped Sikhs)	
Average Flying time per Pilot	290 hours.

110. Losses. This record was accomplished at the cost of eleven aircraft, one combat crew of the 4th Squadron missing in action, and one radio operator of the 35th Squadron missing in action. The radio operator was on loan to the 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron when lost. To balance this, surprisingly enough, the Group was given credit for one Zero destroyed and one probable in the course of operation.

IV. PARATROOP OPERATIONS, JANUARY - JUNE 1944

EXTENT OF PARATROOP OPERATIONS

111. There were very few paratroop operations within the first half of 1944. Aside from the dropping of Joes already described under BALKAN Operations and a few more examples of the same type of drop, there was only one paratroop operation carried out, Mission "PASTY", on the evening of 1 June.

MISSIONS PLANNED

112. There was, however, considerable time spent in planning and training activities for such missions. In January, the 52nd Wing was involved in a series of plans for a paratroop mission in support of operation "SHINGLE," the establishment of the ANZIO beachhead, but at the last minute the mission was abandoned.

113. Towards the end of May, the 62nd Troop Carrier Group, minus the 4th Squadron, which was then in INDIA, was involved in a series of plans formulated with the Fifth Army, according to which the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion would be dropped behind enemy lines to facilitate the advance of the II Corps in the offensive that had begun 11 May 1944. For this purpose, the Group was moved from SICILY up to GAUDO Airfield near SALERNO. But, as events turned out, the progress of our ground troops in the drive to link up with the ANZIO beachhead was so rapid and successful that the paratroops were never called upon.

114. Again in June, extensive plans were worked out for an airborne operation, tentatively set for 17 June, which, in conjunction with French seaborne landings, was to have as its objective the capture of the Island of ELBA. The mission assigned was to drop the 2nd Battalion of the French Infanterie de l'Air Regiment then stationed and training at TRAPANI, SICILY. The primary drop zone chosen was several miles West of PORTO LONGONE, and full details concerning staging, route, approach, and timing were worked out among representatives of the French Army, the French paratroopers, A.F.H.Q., the 87th Fighter Wing, and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing. All was in readiness when the mission was cancelled because of Army intelligence which indicated that the landing forces would be able to handle the situation alone, as later proved to be the case.

MISSION HASTY

115. The one paratroop mission which was both planned and carried out was "HASTY."

116. Planning. Planning was begun only forty-eight hours before the mission was to be attempted. It took place in a conference at 2nd Brigade Headquarters, attended by Brigadier Fritchard, the Brigade Staff, Lt. Col. Edris, Lt. Col. Lacy, and Major Jones of the 62nd Group.

117. The Plan. The mission was carried out by an Eighth Army order. The plan called for the dropping of 3 sticks of twenty paratroopers each and eight sticks of twenty-five dummies each on a drop zone about five miles south of TRASACCO, east of the AVEZZANO-ARCE road. The flight was to rendezvous with twelve Spitfires from 601 Squadron, RAF. Six of these aircraft were to attack TRASACCO immediately prior to the drop and the towns of COLLELONA and VILLA VALLELONGA immediately prior to the return flight. No opposition from the German Air Force was expected, nor were heavy defenses of anti-aircraft.

118. The Purpose. The purpose of the mission was to harass the road from SCRA, already in the hands of the Eighth Army, to AVEZZANO, forcing the enemy to withdraw up the road at such a speed as to prohibit the demolition of the numerous bridges along the road.

119. The Operation. The mission was carried out on the evening of 1 June by eleven aircraft of the 8th Troop Carrier Squadron and proceeded according to plan. Sixty-one paratroopers and two containers were dropped on the drop zone; and 199 dummy parachutists were dropped, half of them a mile before the drop zone, and the other half a mile beyond it. The drop was reported to be in good pattern and a moderately fast jump. Machine-gun fire was encountered close to the target, but no damages were sustained.

NIGHT SORTIES

120. On several occasions later in the month of June, single unescorted night sorties were flown by the 62nd Group to drop C.S.S. personnel in the LAKE TRASIMENE area, well behind the enemy lines. Only one of these missions was unsuccessful, due to weather conditions.

V. OPERATIONS, FRANCE

OPERATION DRAGON

121. Extent of Participation. Troop Carrier played a major role in "Operation DRAGON" not only by its paratroop and glider operations on D-day, but also in extensive resupply and air evacuation missions to and from Southern FRANCE.

122. Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division. For the purposes of the invasion, the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division was formed under which the 51st Troop Carrier Wing operated. Eight groups of 3 squadrons each (48 aircraft per group) plus 3 aircraft with the Air Commander and his Staff personnel, 3 aircraft with the 50th Troop Carrier Wing Headquarters personnel and 12 aircraft with specially trained Pathfinder personnel and equipment, were all sent to the ROE area from the Ninth Air Force. Aside from its own 2 groups, the 62nd and 64th, Headquarters, 51st Troop Carrier Wing was further augmented by the 78th Squadron, 435 Group and the 81st Squadron, 436th Group. Upon completion of the operation, both of these squadrons reverted back to the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing, and the units brought down from ENGLAND were returned to the Ninth Air Force.

123. Headquarters, FTCAD was established at LIDC DI ROMA, with the three Wing Headquarters at ORBETELLO, LIDC DI ROMA and TARQUINIA, and the squadrons were distributed among various airfields in the ROE area. Following were the total forces available to FTCAD:

32 Squadrons of C-47 and C-51, total of 415 aircraft and crews.

374 Glider pilots (15 British Horsa pilots not included).

368 Waco Gliders (CG-4A's).

35 Horsa Gliders (British).

124. Training. The 62nd and 64th Groups, already in the ROE area, were relieved of most routine daily operations, including the evacuation of wounded from the ITALIAN front, upon arrival of the other Troop Carrier units in the theater. This enabled both of the groups to devote all possible time to training. It was required that they be proficient in all types of formation flying by 1 August. Hence, emphasis was laid on


formations, by day and by night, with and without gliders, and with and without paratroops; and numerous simulated glider and paradrop missions were flown.

125. The Routing Used. In order to make navigation as easy as possible for Troop Carrier units, the 50th, 51st and 53rd Wings, respectively, assembled in the ORBETELLO, LIDO DI ROMA and TARQUINIA areas. All aircraft then proceeded to the Command Departure Point, which was on the Northeast tip of ELBA, and from there continued at an altitude of 2,000 feet out a ten mile wide corridor over naval craft markers to the initial point at AGAY ("Ithaca"), 43° 26' 00" N - 06° 53' 50" E, thence to their respective drop zones. After drops and releases, the aircraft made a gradual 180° turn to the right to an altitude of 3,000 feet, and returned to home bases on a reciprocal route. Navigational aids were present in the form of three boats spaced at intervals between the FRENCH coast and CORSICA, an island GIRAGLIA, off the North extremity of CAP CORSE, and three capes on the ITALIAN coast, with Polophane Lights, Eureka Beacons, and M/F Beacons.


126. Formations and Loadings. After months of concentrated effort on formation flying, those which through experience proved to be the most maneuverable and permitted best concentrations on the ground were used. In the parachute columns, the formations were nine ship VEE of VEE's, in serials up to 45 aircraft, in trail, with five minute interval head to head between serial lead aircraft. In the glider columns, the formations were pair of pairs, echeloned up to the right, serials up to 48 aircraft towing gliders, in trail, with eight minute intervals between serial lead aircraft. Aircraft carried a maximum load of 5,430 pounds, which included the weight of special equipment such as parapacks, glider pick-up gear, etc. CG-4A gliders were allowed a maximum of 3,750 pounds, which did not include the weight of life rafts.

127. Pathfinder Teams. Airborne Pathfinder teams were dropped on 3 predetermined drop zones by three serials of three aircraft each of the 9th Troop Carrier Command Pathfinder Unit. These teams preceded the main parachute columns by sixty minutes and established Eureka Beacons, M/F Beacons and lighted TEE's on each drop zone, and placed fluorescent panels on landing zones for glider landings during daylight hours.

128. Drop and Landing Zones. The 51st Troop Carrier Wing glider and Paratroop operations were carried out in DZ-IZ 0 and IZ A. The combination parachute and glider zone included an area of cultivated fields and pasture lands, about one mile wide and two miles long, with its center approximately 1 ½ miles due north from the village of LE MUY. The area included several large fields



A formation of invasion aircraft
on their way to Southern FRANCE.



C-47's pulling CG-4A gliders
toward Southern FRANCE for
the invasion.


with capacities for 50 to 60 gliders and many smaller fields with capacities for 10 to 20 gliders each. It had an average altitude of 192 feet above sea level, ground of silt and gravel, and was ideal for both parachute and glider landings.

129. DZ "A" was a parachute drop zone only. It lay about 2½ miles from DZ-LZ "C" to the southwest. This area was also flat, and averaged about ¾ of a mile on its north-south axis. The center of the area was about one mile south-southwest of the small village of LA MOTTE, with an average height of 349 feet above sea level. The area sloped gently to the east. Immediately adjacent to the west the terrain rose to 600 and 700 feet, and to the north and south of the area there were points over 500 feet nearby. To the east and northeast the terrain sloped gently down toward the river beds.

130. Mission Albatross. Early on D-day, 15 August 1944, 126 aircraft of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing participated in "Mission ALBATROSS", a paradrop operation. Carrying combat personnel of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.), and canisters of supplies, the ships took off from their bases in ITALY and headed for the coast of Southern FRANCE. The flight over the LIGURIAN Sea was uneventful and the only enemy gunfire seen was that from small arms in the drop zone area. It had been agreed previously that NC paratroops or gliders would be returned to the staging airfields and, consequently, two passes had to be made in some instances over the drop zone to accomplish this. Both DZ-LZ "C" and DZ "A" were used for the paradrop, and all troops and canisters were dropped in good concentration. The 126 participating aircraft had returned to their respective bases by 0730 hours, 30 minutes before H-hour for the actual invasion.

131. Mission "Dove". In the evening of the same day, 97 aircraft of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, towing 97 CG-4A gliders, loaded with combat personnel of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.), arms, ammunition, jeeps and trailers to reinforce the paratroops, left their ITALIAN bases and headed for Southern FRANCE to take part in "Mission DOVE". Visibility was poor during an uneventful flight to the landing zone. However, over the landing zone it was clear and all ground signals were easily visible. Because of the rolling terrain, gliders were released at altitudes varying from 2-1,000 feet, instead of the usual 800 feet.

132. Upon release from their tug aircraft, glider pilots were confronted with several difficulties: first, they had to find their designated landing fields; second, having found them, it was discovered that other gliders had already landed there and additional fields had to be chosen with the least possible delay; and third, actual landings were extremely difficult because of the anti-glider poles put up by the Germans in anticipation of just such an action. Actually, casualties among glider pilots



Paradrop over Southern
France on D-Day.



Gliders on Landing Zone in
Southern France on D-Day.

were small, although five pilots were killed and 25 pilots were injured. Most of the gliders were wrecked beyond salvage in landing because of the anti-glider poles, but all cargoes were landed and unloaded in good condition with the exception of a few isolated instances. Glider pilots helped unload the cargoes and then started for the Command Post to which they were to report.

133. Return of the Glider Pilots. On 16 August, the glider pilots were reunited and immediately pressed into duty. German prisoners began pouring in and 3 glider pilots were designated as guards for each group of 50 prisoners. The "guards" marched their prisoners to the beach, where they were loaded onto LCI's and taken to CORSICA. The glider pilots were also taken to CORSICA on LCI's and were taken from there to their respective bases in ITALY by C-47's. 19 August saw all glider pilots return to their bases with the exception of but a few stragglers.

134. Supporting Missions. In addition to "Missions ALBATROSS and DOVE", the ships of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing carried out resupply missions to elements of the 7th Army in Southern FRANCE during the night of 16/17 August and on 17 August. All drops were made in the valley north of LE MUY.

135. Summary. The total effort made by the 51st Troop Carrier Wing during "Operation DRAGCON" is shown in the following statistics:

Sorties Flown	262
CG-4A Gliders Towed	97
Airborne Personnel Carried	1,979
Jeeps carried	46
Artillery pieces carried	3
Equipment and Materiel Delivered to the Combat Area (lbs).	579,203

RESUMILY

136. 64th Group Moves to FRANCE. While "Operation DRAGCON", itself, was ended around D plus 28, the 51st Troop Carrier Wing still carried on extensive resupply mission to FRANCE. The American 7th Army moved ahead so rapidly that it was impossible to maintain supply and communications lines, and only through the efforts of Troop Carrier was resupply made possible. To accomplish this task, on or about 9 September, the air echelons of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 35th Squadrons of the 64th Group were moved to ISTRES LE TUBE, FRANCE, from CIAMF INC, ITALY. The 16th and

35th Squadrons remained there until 11 October, and the 17th and 18th Squadrons carried on the work alone until 11 November, when operations were taken over by the Ninth Air Force.

137. While these squadrons were in FRANCE, every available plane was flown every day possible up to improvised air-strips at DIJON, AMBERIEU, BRON, LOYETTES, VALENCE, SAN RAFAEL, DOLE and LUXEUIL. All of which were but a short distance behind the front lines. In the beginning, gasoline for fighter groups was the prime essential; and later clothing, rations, ammunition and numerous other items were added to the list and ferried up to the front. Each plane always took off with a maximum load of the essential materials.

138. Scope of Activities. The following table for only one month's operations by the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron gives an example of the variety of supplies carried by each squadron of the 64th Troop Carrier Group:

7 September - 10 October 1944

100 Octane gas	4,513 Drums
80 Octane gas	565 Drums
Diesel oil	230 5-gal. cans
SAE oil	81 5-gal. cans
1120 oil	964 5-gal. cans
Belly tanks	96
Bombs	44 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Bomb fuses	852 lbs
50 and 30 Cal. ammunition	501 $\frac{1}{4}$ tons
Bomb fins	20 each
Blankets and litters	71 tons
QM clothing	91 tons
Rations	170 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Hospital and medical equip	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons
Freight	140 tons
Wire and Signal equipment	14 tons
(plus 130 spools of wire)	
Passengers	181
U.S. Litter patients	521
U.S. Walking patients	251
German Litter patients	49
German Walking patients	9

(plus 2 cases of flares and 76 aircraft tires)

Approximately 500 sorties flown during this period.

139. Summary of Resupply Operations in FRANCE. The re-supply problem in FRANCE, as indicated above, fell into two operations; carrying supplies from ITALY to FRANCE and transporting supplies within FRANCE itself from rear bases to forward areas. The following chart shows the amount accomplished in these two separate efforts.

Materiel Transported to FRANCE.

Rations	53 tons
V-80 gas	92.5 tons
100 Octane gas	347.5 tons
Bombs and Ammo.	98.5 tons
Miscellaneous	157
Total	748.5 tons

Materiel Transported from Base Supply to Forward Areas.

Rations	824 tons
V-80 gas	497 tons
QM clothing	186.6 tons
100 Octane gas	3,087 tons
Bombs and Ammo.	419.5 tons
Miscellaneous	420.5 tons
Total	8,294.1 tons

AIR EVACUATION

140. Almost without exception, every plane returned from the front laden with United States, German and other walking and litter patients. It was of tremendous assistance to the forward areas and benefit to the wounded, but it also proved to be a considerable tax on the aircraft of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, since after commitments were made to both the ITALIAN and BALKAN areas, it was necessary to send ships to ISTRES LE TUBE, FRANCE, to bring the patients to ROME and NAPLES hospitals. The trip from the front to ITALIAN hospitals was a total of some 1,000 miles and had to be made in 2 laps, while it was only 225 miles to PARIS and 450 to LONDON. While air evacuation was definitely beneficial for the patients, it was also a detriment in some cases. Very often it was necessary to bivouac the patients in crowded and uncomfortable conditions at ISTRES LE TUBE, causing them greater distress than necessary because of the layover and the long journey.

141. The 802nd and 807th Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons report the following figures for the evacuation of patients from FRANCE.

	<u>Patients</u>	<u>Patient Miles</u>	<u>Patient Flying Time</u>
August	1078	146,390	2,456:40
September	7122	2,764,880	21,851:25
October	8416	3,198,089	24,090:15
November	519	175,689	1,346:20
Totals	17135	6,285,048	48,744:40

CHERBOURG-MAUFERTUS MISSION:

142. Toward the end of October, a hurry call was received from the 5th Army to ferry approximately 3,000 troops from CHERBOURG to the ITALIAN front. On 24 October, virtually all air evacuation was cancelled and every plane available was sent to FRANCE for this purpose. Weather en route was extremely bad, causing several days' delay in delivery of the troops and RCN's of various ships all along the route to and from CHERBOURG. Because of this, the operation was not completed until early November, when it had been originally anticipated that it would only take about three days.

143. The troops were picked up at MAUFERTUS and QUERQUEVILLE Airfields, east and west of CHERBOURG respectively, and successfully delivered to the proper fields in ITALY in 203 complete round trips.

144. Losses. Weather was not the only thing which hampered these operations. One plane, after diving through an opening in the clouds, received two direct hits by heavy flak from an isolated German pocket in Southern FRANCE. The pilot was severely wounded in the right leg by a third hit before the plane crashed into the BAY OF BISCAY, a short distance off shore from LA ROCHELLE.

145. The crew and 15 infantrymen escaped from the sinking plane; and all were picked up by a German patrol boat about 20 minutes later, except one man who drowned. The men were taken to a German hospital for treatment. Medical facilities were very limited, but evidently the Germans did their best to save the wounded pilot. After a couple of days, gangrene set in his leg, necessitating amputation. He died two weeks after the accident.

146. The French made arrangements for an exchange of prisoners: The FFI turned over one German Officer and one German non-commissioned officer for the entire crew and list of passengers aboard the ill-fated plane. It is interesting to note that the Germans salvaged all of the sunken C-47 except the tail section.


147. Altogether, 5 planes were lost during these operations: One was a total loss because of an accident on the airfield, there were four fatalities among crew and passengers of another, two other planes were completely lost, but no fatalities were sustained, and the fifth which was cited above.

VI. OPERATIONS, GREECE

OPERATION MANNA:

148. Purpose. During the year, various missions were flown to GREECE for nickeling and supply drop purposes. These missions were all handled by units covering the BALKAN countries. However, in October, concentrated effort in the form of "Operation MANNA" was put forth by all units of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, except those units operating in FRANCE. The purpose of the operation was to ferry in paratroops and glider troops of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.), as well as supplies. These operations were to be timed with the withdrawal of German forces, and the troops were to help maintain control until the Greek officials in exile returned.

149. Planning. Early in September, plans were formulated for this operation by representatives of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, BAF and the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.). Although Troop Carrier was given no definite date for D-day, they were told that the operation would take place within the next two weeks. However, not until 10 October were they notified that D-day would be 15 October. Preparations were begun immediately to assemble the necessary aircraft and personnel. The 10th Squadron, 60th Group, was still at BRINDISI, and the 51st Squadron, 62nd Group, had moved to FOGGIA Main Airfield to begin taking over BALKAN operations. The remaining aircraft of



Routing Map for Operation "MANNA"

the 60th and 62nd Groups were alerted and all planes were to be ready for the operation on 13 October.

150. Late on 11 October, the order was changed and D-day was set for 13 October, which necessitated getting the airplanes to the staging airfields at BRINDISI, SAN PANCRAZIO and MANDURIA on 12 October. This in itself was difficult because most of the planes were engaged in other missions. The Air Staff of the 51st Wing joined forces with BAF Headquarters for final conferences and late in the evening of D-minus 1, Field Order #5 was published and distributed.

151. Communications. Communications were set up between the Wing Command Post, (at SAN PANCRAZIO) BAF, and staging airfields at MANDURIA and BRINDISI. Excellent results were obtained from the point to point radio station and air-to-ground radio installed near the Command Post; however, since a direct line was not set up between fighter bases, which were to furnish escort; and the Command Post, communications were not completely adequate. From 14 October until the completion of operations, one aircraft and crew remained at MEGARA Airfield, GREECE, as radio control. Not until 16 October was ground control established at KALAMAKI Airfield, GREECE, and landing operations were greatly simplified from then on.

152. Routing and Tactics. The route for all operations in GREECE was to be the same: from base (BRINDISI, SAN PANCRAZIO or MANDURIA) to Wing Departure Point, CAPE MARIA D'LEUCA, CAPE DCUYATC, ARAXOS Airfield, CAPE DIREFANON, 37° 55' 40" N - 23° 02' 10" E - 37° 56' 20" N - 23° 18' 22" E to MEGARA Airfield. The return route was reciprocal. From the Wing Departure point ships were to fly at 2,000 feet to 37° 55' 40" N - 23° 02' 10" E and then start their descent to 800 feet MSL. Drop altitude and release altitude for gliders was at 800 feet MSL, with the return altitude at 3,000 feet MSL. Outbound paratroop and glider tug aircraft were flown at 140 and 120 mph IAS respectively; and all aircraft returned at 150 mph IAS. Drop speed for paratroops, canisters, etc., was at 110 mph IAS. Those ships carrying paratroops were in a formation of VEE of VEE's of 3 aircraft, echelon to the right, with 15 seconds between elements. Glider tow aircraft were in 2 ship elements, echelon to the right, with 15 seconds between elements.

153. The Operation. "Operation MANNA" was scheduled to begin 13 October 1944. However, completely without the knowledge of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, 8 aircraft of the 10th Squadron, 60th Group (then under the operational control of BAF) were sent to MEGARA Airfield with the first contingent of the 2nd Independent Para-



Anxious Athenian women care for injured British paratrooper whose ankle was spreined in landing.

chute Brigade (Br.). Fighter escort was provided and the mission was carried out without incident, although many paratroopers were injured in landing as a result of high winds over the drop zone.

154. On the morning of 13 October, 9 aircraft towing CG-4A gliders took off from MANDURIA for MEGARA, GREECE, without fighter escort. The flight was made successfully and the 9 gliders were released over the landing zone. All gliders were seen to land safely. The returning aircraft landed at ARAXOS Airfield, GREECE, (which field had been set up as a refueling and supply station) to refuel and then proceed to their home fields. The original flights scheduled for paratroopers on 13 October were cancelled by the Officer Commanding, 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.) because of reported high winds over the drop zone.

155. Bad weather was encountered on 14 October between CAPE DCUKATC and the drop zone by 68 aircraft bearing paratroops. However, the formation leader successfully maneuvered around it and paratroops and canisters were dropped over MEGARA as scheduled. Fighter escort was provided by 14 F-38's which joined the formation at the Wing Departure Point. On this day, one ship from Headquarters, 51st Troop Carrier Wing landed at MEGARA and remained there as ground control.

156. Originally, it was planned that the ships would land instead of making a paradrop. However, after the one advance plane did land, it was discovered that the field was full of craters and holes, making mass landings impossible. The planes in the air were then signalled to have the paratroops jump instead of landing them.

157. Considerable confusion was added by the native Greeks whom the Airborne Engineers, who had been dropped two days before by the 10th Squadron, were employing to fill up holes and bomb craters on the airfield. The Engineers, much to their continual dismay, had to hustle them back to their work every few minutes. When the first flight of paratroop ships came over, the natives banded together in small groups all around the field. The minute a paratrooper landed, the Greeks ran out to collapse his 'chute; and before he knew what was going on, he was on his feet, dusted off, and being handed his rifle. The unfortunate ones who landed a bit too hard and were stunned momentarily found themselves virtually fighting for their lives because of the solicitous Greeks who gathered immediately and tried to administer First Aid.

158. Twenty aircraft towing CG-4A gliders, which were sent out on the 14th, encountered the same bad weather en route and were ordered to return to ITALY by the flight leader.



Greek Partisans of all ages gather
around British paratroopers.

159. The missions for 15 October called for dropping bundles and canisters on MEGARA Airfield. Fighter escort was provided and joined the 14 C-47's at the Wing Departure Point. The formation made two passes at the field in order to drop the loads and then proceeded to ARAXOS Airfield. All ships were refueled and remained over night to carry out resupply missions the next day.

160. On this same day, another aircraft carrying Communications personnel and equipment flew from SAN PANCRAZIO to ARAXOS for the purpose of setting up a control tower. The ship remained at ARAXOS overnight and returned 16 October with the tow plane operation. One other aircraft ferried supplies to MEGARA and remained there over night.

161. The fourth day of "Operation MANNA" called for the largest-scale operations during the entire period. Personnel, jeeps, mortars, small arms and medical supplies were loaded on 52 aircraft and 21 gliders and flown to MEGARA, GREECE. One glider landed safely after breaking loose and its load was transferred to a tug plane. The formation was joined at ARAXOS by 12 aircraft which were also loaded with supplies. All drops were made successfully at MEGARA, but the one tug plane carrying the glider load was not permitted to land. The 20 gliders were all seen to land safely.

162. Personnel and equipment were loaded onto 37 aircraft on 17 October to be flown to KALAMAKI Airfield, GREECE. All landings were made without incident but take-off from KALAMAKI was somewhat delayed by civilians who swarmed around the crews. One aircraft remained overnight at KALAMAKI because of a flat tire and another ship stopped at ARAXOS to pick up 2 patients and ferry them to BARI. All other aircraft returned to their home bases.


163. Two flights of 18 ships each carrying personnel and equipment, flew from SAN PANCRAZIO to KALAMAKI on the last day of "Operation MANNA", 18 October. Both flights were successful and unloading was carried out smoothly. One aircraft remained over night at KALAMAKI because of a flat tire. On the return trip, 7 aircraft of the first flight landed at ARAXOS to pick up personnel and equipment of AASB and ferry them to SAN PANCRAZIO.

164. Summary. During the entire operation no losses of aircraft or personnel were sustained, and all troops and equipment were delivered safely to their respective destinations. Approximately 2,000 personnel and 327 tons of equipment were dropped or landed during the 7 days of the operations.

ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS

165. Toward the latter part of November, an airborne operation in support of the 8th Army troops was planned. For this purpose, most of the members of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.) who had gone to GREECE in October, were brought back to ITALY. The operation was not carried out. However, civil strife broke out in GREECE and it was determined to return the paratroops to that country.

166. Planes of the 60th and 64th Groups ferried a number of the British troops to GROT TAGLIE for transshipment to GREECE by water. On the 2nd and 3rd of December, planes of these two groups ferried some 1,500 British Infantry troops from the 8th Army front to SALONIKA and ATHENS. After the initial return of the troops, several missions were flown to GREECE for the purpose of carrying ammunition, blood plasma, and other supplies. On the return trip from GREECE, the planes towed back gliders which had been left there after "Operation MANNA".




Loading canisters onto racks of
C-47's in preparation for opera-
tion "MANNA"



Members of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.) have a last cup of tea before the take off.



British paratroopers prior to boarding
the C-47 for GREECE.



Boarding the transport.



Bon Voyage!







On their way to GREECE.




Aircraft coming over the Drop
Zone at MEGARA Airfield GREECE




Ferutroopers and canisters
leave the planes.



More paratroopers jump over the
Drop Zone at EGARA Airfield.




Hearing the Drop Zone.



Natives rushing to the aid of
paratroopers.




Greek partisans collapse a
British paratroopers' chute.



Injured paratrooper received
First Aid.




..... and a cigarette.



Amicable relations are established with native Greeks.



..... of various types.



Brigadier Pritchard (Commanding General of the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (Br.)), and Brigadier General Manning discuss the success of Operation "MARGIA."

VII. OPERATIONS, ITALY

BACKGROUND

167. As already discussed under BALKAN operations, Troop Carrier had, at various times been active in re-supply to partisan groups in ITALY. However, these operations did not take on a major aspect until November. Previous to that time, only a trickle of supplies had been reaching the partisan groups in Northern ITALY, and as a result they were gradually losing heart for lack of shoes, socks, ammunition and guns.

168. Patriots infiltrated through enemy lines to Southern FRANCE or TUSCANY with urgent pleas that this situation be remedied, and special Allied ground teams that had, in some cases, been waiting for months to operate effectively in Northern ITALY added their appeal. A few B-17's and B-24's were attempting to care for these distant groups and occasional fighter-bomber sorties over Northwestern ITALY had just barely kept partisan hopes alive.

UNITS PARTICIPATING

169. Troop Carrier agreed to take over these operations south of the PO VALLEY and in the PIEMONTE, and the first sorties were flown by the 4th and 8th Squadrons of the 62nd Group from MALIGNANO Airfield on 26 November. The 7th Squadron was relieved from BALKAN operations on 1 December and moved to TARQUINIA where it, too, joined in re-supply to the Italian partisans.

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

170. Orders for these partisan drops were received from Headquarters, 15th Army Group by MATAF who, in turn, allocated the targets by priority. Virtually the same tactics were used as for BALKAN operations; that is, prearranged drop signals on the drop zones, ground-to-air letters, etc.

OPERATIONS

171. Whenever weather permitted, these three squadrons flew missions to Northern ITALY. Here, as for the BALKAN operations,

weather was the main cause for non-effective sorties. On many occasions, if the planes were able to leave their home field, they met bad weather en route to or over the drop zone area and were forced to return to base with their full loads. However, wrong signals, no signals at all or enemy activity also caused non-effective sorties.

172. Added to the weather hazard were the numerous flak areas in German-held ITALY, which were constantly on the alert for any Allied aircraft. The missions were always flown with fighter escort, and C-47 pilots were continuously being warned by the fighter pilots that enemy fighters were in the vicinity.

173. The number of drop zones available was also very limited because during November and December, the enemy intensified his efforts to get control of certain partisan areas with considerable success. This did not necessarily mean that the areas were lost to the partisans or closed to Troop Carrier units for good, since the guerilla forces merely go into hiding at such times until the enemy must move some of his strength elsewhere.

LOSSES

174. During the five weeks period of these operations in 1944, only one plane was lost. On 30 December, a plane of the 4th Squadron encountered turbulent air, went into a spin, and crashed and burned near the drop zone. One bundle was seen to fall out of the aircraft, but no parachutes were observed and no activity was seen on the ground after the crash. It was presumed that all members of the crew had been killed.

SUMMARY

175. C.S.S. Officials had stated that they would be content if a minimum monthly average of 100 tons could be supplied to the partisans by Troop Carrier. How far the squadrons surpassed that figure is shown by the following statistics covering the period from 26 November through 31 December 1944.

Total Sorties	350
Successful	213
Unsuccessful	137
Supplies dropped	862,708 (net pounds)
Persons infiltrated	51

SUMMARY OF UNSUCCESSFUL SORTIES

Weather	111
No Ground Signals or	
Reception	15
Enemy fighters	6
No fighter escort	4
Enemy fire	1
Total	<hr/> 137

VIII. ROUTINE OPERATIONS

AIR EVACUATION:

176. Units Participating. The most interesting of the routine operations carried on by Troop Carrier units during the year was that of Air Evacuation, which was handled by the 802nd and 807th Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons, operating with ships and crews allocated to that purpose from the various groups. All Groups participated in this activity at one time or another, including the Groups belonging to the 52nd Wing during the month of January. The greater portion of the work, however, was carried out by planes and crews of the 62nd Group, especially from April on and including the very important month of June, when almost half of the patients evacuated during the first six months were carried. Prior to the invasion of Southern FRANCE, air evacuation usually done by the 51st Troop Carrier Wing planes was turned over to the Troop Carrier Wings brought down from ENGLAND. However, after the invasion, air evacuation reverted to the 51st Wing, and during September all available planes were used to this end.

177. Statistics. The following table shows the totals for numbers of personnel evacuated by the 802nd and 807th Air Evacuation Squadrons during 1944. Since it includes the figures for operations done with the Troop Carrier units from ENGLAND, the totals are somewhat higher for the year than the corresponding figures for the 51st Troop Carrier Wing alone.

PATIENTS EVACUATED BY AIR - 1944

	TOTAL	LITTER	WALKING	AMER.	BRITISH	FRENCH	POLOISH	ITALIAN	F.C.W.	OTHER
January	5579	2789	2790	3430	1278	829	C	0	31	11
February	4042	2530	1512	1084	1902	997	C	C	59	C
March	3936	2530	1406	788	2567	555	C	C	26	C
April	1688	901	781	555	1060	71	C	2	0	C
May	4095	2522	1573	3057	937	2	18	10	70	1
June	17414	10255	7159	8824	4552	2915	C	C	949	174
July	22974	13057	9532	9642	7940	3034	1301	151	516	5
August	10715	5233	5482	4395	4946	17	1017	179	149	22
September	21198	13613	7585	11796	7476	6	127	85	1691	17
October	18326	11130	7196	15292	1734	325	4	35	889	47
November	5931	3050	2881	4476	1299	90	12	0	45	9
December	6376	3257	3119	4375	1899	3	25	2	71	1
<u>Total:</u>	121889	70673	51016	67714	37590	6844	2504	464	4496	287

178. Interpretation of the Statistics. It will be noticed that the numbers of patients evacuated declined steadily from January through April. Actually, that trend continued until 26 May, on which date air evacuation operations were begun from the air-strip on the ANZIO beachhead. The apparent rise in numbers in May results entirely from the operations of the last few days of the month, during which 2,024 patients were evacuated to the NAPLES area.

179. This decline was the result of two factors: first the stabilizing of the front along the line of the GARIGLIANO; and second, the movement of General Hospital facilities from NORTH AFRICA to ITALY and particularly to the NAPLES area. Up until 19 March, the regular evacuation route carried the majority of evacuees to BIZERTE and ALGIERS. After that date, NAPLES (and for the British, BARI and CATANIA) became the normal centers to which patients were carried.

180. Another change which will be noticed is the increase in the numbers of British over Americans evacuated from February through April. This results initially from the fact that the 807th MAES was located in BARI for the express purpose of serving the Eighth Army on the ADRIATIC coast. Later, when the Eighth shifted some of its troops to the CASSINO front, they were served also by the 802nd MAES.

181. The tremendous figures shown for August, September and October are a direct result of the invasion of Southern FRANCE. During the month of November, the 802nd and 807th MAES were relieved of duty in FRANCE and handled only evacuees from the ITALIAN front throughout the remainder of the year, which accounts for the smaller figures after the month of October. Another factor which has bearing on the decreased figures for the last two months of the year was the comparative stability of the lines on the ITALIAN front.

182. Bases Used. The Allied advance into Central ITALY, which started on 11 May, changed the entire picture for air evacuation. Once again, as previously in TUNISIA and SICILY, it was in a position to serve its primary purpose, which is to relieve congestion in forward hospitals, allowing them to move forward rapidly with the troops.

183. It had originally been planned to accomplish something of this nature for the ANZIC beachhead, but the fact that the air-strip there was within range of shell-fire made it impossible. One attempt was made on 16 March, but the venture was unsuccessful though no losses ensued from it.

184. However, starting with 26 May, air evacuation from the forward areas was begun and continued in increasing numbers throughout the remainder of the period. As the troops advanced, air evacuation kept pace with them. By the end of June, forward bases were established at VITERBO, ORVIETO, MONTALTO, and CHERCONE (GRASSE). The highest number of patients evacuated on any one day since the AFRICAN invasion was reported on 29 June, when eleven hundred and seventy-nine were evacuated from forward airfields to the NAILES area.

185. With the invasion of Southern FRANCE, casualties were so light in the beginning that air evacuation of patients was not started until 22 August. However, by the end of August, air evacuation was going full tilt in FRANCE, and both the 802nd and 807th MAES had detachments stationed there. Again, as the Armies moved forward, air evacuation followed right in their footsteps. Patients were evacuated from such forward fields as ISTRES LE TUBE, RAMATUELLE, and LUXEUIL, the fields being only a few miles behind the front lines. These two squadrons continued to operate from FRANCE until the middle of November, when they returned to ITALY.

186. With headquarters at LIDO DI ROMMA, the end of 1944 found the 802nd and 807th MAES still carrying on their work from advanced fields. FERRETOLA/FLORENCE, FISA, RIMINI and the ISLE OF VIS were among those most forward. Patients were evacuated from these fields to ROMME, NAILES or BARI.

187. Losses. Only two losses occurred during the year. On 24 February, a transport carrying sixteen patients, fourteen of them British, one evacuation nurse and one surgical technician of the 807th MAES, and the six crew members crashed into the side of a mountain near CALTAGIRONE, SICILY, killing all personnel aboard. No cause for the accident was ever ascertained.

188. On 1 November, the second accident occurred when a transport carrying fifteen patients (six of them Prisoners of War), four crew members and one evacuation nurse of the 802nd MAES crashed in FRANCE after encountering violent storms. All personnel on board the ship were killed.

189. These are the only two cases where patients died while under the care of either of the two Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons.



Ambulances arriving at parked C-47 Transport on advanced field in FLORENCE, ITALY.



Checking patients and diagnosis before loading them on airplane at FLORENCE.



Unloading patient from
Ambulance, FLORENCE.



Loading patient on air-
plane at FLORENCE.




A litter patient is loaded
carefully onto a C-47.



Helping ambulatory patients aboard.

Patients en route to a General
Hospital





Flight nurse checks over her patients during the trip.



helping one of her patients.



A cigarette helps pass the time.



Reporting the load at the "end of the line"



Unloading patients at airfield, NAPLES



Checking X-Rays and diagnosis
at the General Hospital before
unloading patients.

Patients being unloaded at
General Hospital in NAPLES.





Patients awaiting a ward assignment at a General Hospital in NAPLES after being evacuated successfully by air.

NON-TACTICAL TRANSPORTATION

190. Units Participating. In spite of the amount of tactical operations performed by Troop Carrier during 1944, its most consistent operation was the steady routine job of hauling supplies and key personnel to the forward areas. At times one squadron was placed on DS with MATS and assisted in the regular transport runs. Troop Carrier planes were continuously active in moving units from rear areas into ITALY, CORSICA, SARDINIA and FRANCE, and in hauling supplies to them afterward.

191. These were purely routine jobs which were engaged in by ships and crews of all groups whenever they were made available by being released from tactical operations in which they might be engaged or for which they were training. In April and May, the demand for such services so far exceeded the number of planes available from tactical operations that a Liaison Officer was established at Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force to set priorities under which these requests could be fulfilled. The return of the five squadrons from INDIA in June relieved the situation and the need for such a Liaison Officer disappeared.

192. As already discussed under FRENCH and BALKAN operations, during these particular times one entire group was engaged for each of the two separate operations. When the two Groups, the 64th and 60th respectively, were relieved of these duties, transportation congestion in the 51st Wing was further alleviated.

193. Statistics. Figures for the 52nd Wing on the work of this nature accomplished by them in January are not available, but the following statistics show the amounts carried by the 51st Wing during 1944:

Passengers carried	163,535
Airborne Troops carried	30,800
Pounds of Freight hauled	54,306,190

These figures do not include those already given for tactical operations, nor the numbers of patients evacuated by the Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons.

IX. SUMMARY FOR 1944.

STATISTICS

194. The following table gives a complete summary of the combined statistics on the work done by the 51st Troop Carrier Wing during the year 1944.

Hours flown	162,866	
Combat sorties	5,957	- (Effective - 4,396 (Non- " - 1,561
Passengers	169,285	
Airborne troops	30,800	
Patients evacuated	108,812	
Tons dropped	7,900	
Mules	414	
Pounds of freight	67,122,938	
Pounds of nickels	727,740	

Persons evacuated from BALKAN countries are counted as passengers in the above totals, although many were patients. This amounts to an overall picture of 316,797 persons having been carried, plus the 414 mules, and a total of 33,925.34 tons of freight and nickels.

ANNEX 'A'

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY FIRST TROOP CARRIER WING
A.F.O. 650

15 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Dropping by Rebecca-Eureka.

TO : Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Group, APO 650.
62d Troop Carrier Group, APO 650.
64th Troop Carrier Group, APC 650.

1. The following procedure was used on two practice drops recently with very satisfactory results:

a. On the first mission the aircraft was loaded with ten (10) panniers and a British dispatcher crew, and Rebecca-Eureka only was used for homing onto the DZ.

b. On the second mission weighted streamers were thrown from the door on signal by the pilot, so as to mark approximate location of drop, and both MF Beacon and Rebecca-Eureka were used for homing onto the DZ.

2. a. After take-off the aircraft was flown some distance from the DZ area and the pilot was put "under the hood" so as to simulate instrument conditions. The aircraft was then put through a series of maneuvers by the pilot so as to get the "feel" of the plane and put it in proper trim.

b. The Rebecca operator was then requested to give headings for "homing" on the DZ Eureka.

c. As the aircraft approached the DZ the Radar operator called off the distances from the DZ on the interphone to the pilot, who gradually decreased speed to 120 MPH and altitude during approach using both barometric altimeter and radio altimeter. (Dropping altitude 600-800 feet above terrain).

d. At one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) mile from the DZ the Radar operator called "READY" and the pilot turned on the "RED" jump signal light. Upon reaching the DZ (indication on Rebecca) the operator called "GO" and the "GREEN" light was flashed by the pilot.

e. The pilot then immediately set his directional gyro to 0° and continued ahead for fifteen (15) seconds. Made a 180° "procedure turn" to the left, noting the magnetic compass heading at time of drop and when straightening out at 180° heading by gyro. This reverse heading was flown

for two minutes when another 180° "procedure turn" to the left was made and the Radar operator notified "heading for DZ".

f. The Radar operator then took over and the Eureka signal usually came on the screen "dead ahead" each time the 0° heading was picked up and aircraft was "homed" onto the DZ Eureka as covered in b, c, and d above. The pilot followed procedure as in e above immediately following each drop.

NOTE: Ten (10) "passes" were made on each of the two missions.


3. a. These two practice missions brought out the following facts:

- (1) Dropping on a Rebecca-Eureka signal is practical and feasible.
- (2) The degree of accuracy is dependent upon numerous factors, i.e:
 - (a) The experience of the crew (Radar operator, pilot, dispatcher) in working as a coordinated team.
 - (b) The terrain features and weather conditions at the DZ. (Obstacles, altitude, wind direction and velocity, visibility, etc.).
 - (c) The proper functioning of the equipment.

b. The MF Beacon is not essential, but is very desirable, from a pilots viewpoint in making allowances for wind drift on the approach to the DZ under instrument conditions when the approximate wind direction and velocity are known.

c. A surprisingly accurate "pattern" can be flown in a cross-wind with moderate turbulence under instrument conditions (simulated by pilot being under the hood). Accurate drops were made while allowing 10° - 12° for drift during the approach.

NOTE: The direction of drift can usually be determined on the first approach if a great deal of change in heading is necessary in either direction immediately prior to reaching the DZ Eureka. Allowance should be made in that direction on the next approach, and this is simplified if an MF Beacon is operating on the DZ. The pilot merely needs to inform Radar operator that he is allowing a certain number of degrees for drift of the aircraft to the right or left, as the case may be.



Altitude: 800 to 1000 ft. absolute.
 Air speed: 120 mph, indicated.

Ltr: Hq, 51st TC Wg, subj: Dropping by Rebecca-Eureka, dtd 15 Dec. 1944
(cont'd)

4. It is believed that practice as a team (pilot, Radar operator) will do more towards increasing the accuracy of drops than any other factor, with equipment that is functioning properly. Certainly, the size of the pattern (two (2) minute leg) could be reduced as the team-work is perfected.

5. It is desired that organizations select crews and practice dropping under simulated instrument conditions in order to convince the operating crews of it's feasibility and perfect this method for resupplying isolated units.

By command of Brigadier General MANNING:

ROY C. EMERY,
CWO, U.S.A.,
Asst adjutant.

REC'D & COPIED

ANNEX 'B'

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY FIRST TROOP CARRIER WING
A.P.O. 650

14 December 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 22)

FLYING PROCEDURE FOR REBECCA-EUREKA DRCS

1. The following is a suggested flying procedure for dropping with extreme accuracy on Eureka Beacons, which is adaptable to the conditions under which we will operate in resupplying units in Northern Italy. It takes into consideration the need for several runs on a target in order to discharge a number of bundles, each directly over the target. It may be necessary to make as many runs as there are bundles. EXTREME ACCURACY IS ESSENTIAL.

2. On first approach, navigator will bring aircraft to the vicinity of the target, and when Eureka is sighted and identified, Radar Operator will home ship on beacon, giving signals over the interphone for "Ready" and "Drop", and allowing, as well as possible, for altitude, velocity, and wind.

a. At the time that radar operator gives the signal to drop, pilot will flash green light, and checking his time, will fly on course for 15 seconds, and zero his gyro compass on that course.

b. At the end of 15 seconds, the pilot will make a standard, single needle width turn for 180 degrees, to the left and continue to the new heading for two minutes.

c. After two minutes on the new course, the pilot will make another standard, single needle width turn to the left for 180 degrees, at which time the radar operator will take over, and home on beacon again.

d. Process will be repeated, until all bundles are discharged.

e. 120 mph indicated airspeed should be flown.

3. Such a procedure will give these results. The Eureka signal will come on the screen at approximately "Dead Ahead" time, leaving little if any correction in heading for the radar operator to make. He can concentrate on time over target, and make each drop as accurate as possible.

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4. It is felt that with such a procedure the accuracy that is desired, and essential for these missions can be achieved, and that our limits for error, plus or minus four hundred yards, can be maintained.

By command of Brigadier General MANNING:

JULIUS A. KOLB,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Dale E. Johnson
DALE E. JOHNSON,
Major, Air Corps,
Asst C of S, A-3.

1 Incl - Diagram for Rebecca-Eureka Drop.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CG, XII AF
- 10 - CG, 60th, 62d, 64th TC Gps.
- 2 - Communications.
- 1 - File (A-3).

DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX 'C'

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY FIRST TROOP CARRIER WING
A.P.O. 650

20 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Tactical Bulletin.

TO : Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, APC
650, US Army. (Thru: CG, Twelfth Air Force).

1. In response to letter, your Headquarters, subject; Tactical Bulletin, dated 4 October 1944, two memoranda, concerning the tactical use of gliders are attached.

2. It is realized, that this is the only unit in this theater which is concerned with glider activities, however, it is believed that this information could be very beneficial to units in other theaters.

3. The method of marshalling and take-off described in Operations Memorandum Number 7, is different from any described by Air Forces Manual Number 3, "Glider Tactics and Technique", however it has been thoroughly tried in all operations of this Wing and found very satisfactory.

4. The contents of Operations Memorandum Number 14 are based on experience, and it is believed that it is the only standard procedure that has been evolved concerning ditching of the CG-4A glider. Dissemination of this information would be especially valuable to all units concerned with tactical glider operations as erroneous ideas about the ditching characteristics of the CG-4A seem to exist. Paragraph 5, b, (4) of the Air Forces Manual Number 3, "Glider Tactics and Technique" states that pre-planned water landing missions are feasible. This is contrary to any experience gathered by this Wing, as the invasion of Sicily has shown that the CG-4A does not lend itself to water landings, as all of the fuselage will submerge immediately. It is believed that any mission planned for water landing will meet with a definite failure.

For the Wing Commander:

ROBERT B. COX,
Lt Col, Air Corps,
Actg Adjutant General.

2 Incls:

Incl 1 - Opns Memo 7, Hq, 51st TC Wg, dtd
18 Apr 44, (dup).

Incl 2 - Opns Memo 14, Hq, 51st TC Wg, dtd
7 Aug 44, (dup)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY FIRST TROOP CARRIER WING
A.P.O. 650

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

7)

18 April 1944.

MARSHALLING AND TAKE OFF PROCEDURE FOR TACTICAL GLIDER OPERATIONS

1. The following will be standard procedure for the marshalling and take-off of glider formations for tactical or simulated tactical purposes.

2. The recommendations of this Memorandum are based on practical experience, therefore, adherence to the principles laid down is of the greatest importance.

a. From a runway of 5000 feet length a maximum of 50 (fifty) gliders can be taken off, leaving sufficient runway for the safe operation of the tug-glider combination. For each additional 60 feet of runway another two gliders, side by side can be added. However, no absolute rule can be set forth as the facilities and surroundings of the particular airfield may necessitate a change.

3. Gliders will be loaded prior to marshalling, i.e., all cargo, except personnel will be in the gliders.

4. Gliders should be assembled on perimeter track or suitable part of the field and the tactical ("stick") number, clearly visible, marked on them in chalk, to facilitate the loading by the airborne personnel. After this has been accomplished and gliders have been loaded in accordance with Operations Memoranda Numbers 3 and 4, this Headquarters, they can be marshalled into take-off position.

5. Several take-off patterns are possible, but the one most suitable and practical for the type of fields encountered in this theatre is the "side spaced feed".

a. Gliders are marshalled in pairs, side by side on the runway and faced in direction of take-off. One row will bear the even numbers and one row the odd numbers. It may be necessary to stagger the pairs slightly if the runway is less than 150 feet wide.

b. The tug aircraft parked on each side of the runway, pointing in the take-off direction at a 45 degree angle. The attached diagram shows the complete marshalling assembly.

c. The distance between gliders (distance from tail of glider to nose of glider behind) should be approximately ten to fifteen feet, but may have to be less if a large number of gliders is to be taken off from one field.



DRAWN TO SCALE 1 INCH EQUALS 400 FEET

- ① TOW ROPES NOT INDICATED.
- ② 3 DOTS INDICATE CONTROL OFFICER AND TWO GLIDER SIGNAL MEN.
- ③ RUNWAY:- 5000FT. X 150FT.

Ops Memo No. 7, Hq. 51st TC Wg, dtd 18 April 1944, (cont'd).

6. Tug aircraft and gliders are then hooked up, care being taken that the excessive tow rope is laid out properly and will not foul with any other aircraft or obstacle on take-off. Intercommunication facilities should then be tested for proper functioning.

7. All pilots and personnel should be in the aircraft fifteen minutes before take off, and remain there. At this time loading manifests can be collected from glider pilots.

8. A single glider take off should be accomplished every thirty seconds, unless the tactical requirements call for different timing.

9. One signal man shall be stationed at the first glider of each row. He shall shout "brakes off" to the glider pilot, and then give the signal to take up slack to the control officer directing the tug. When all slack is taken out he will give the "clear for take off" signal to the control officer.

a. After the glider has rolled off, the signal man will walk back to the next glider and repeat the procedure, the first glider of the other row taking off meanwhile, and so on.

10. The control officer shall signal to the tug to taxi forward and "Clear for take off" when the slack is taken out and the appropriate signal has been received from the glider signal man.

11. All signal men will stand at the left of the tugs and gliders, to be in view of the pilots.

12. Depending on the condition of the field, additional signal men might be advisable at the parked tugs to give the taxi signal and/or a relay man between control officer and glider signal man. As an additional safety measure, a man equipped with an SCR 585-B Radio Set ("Walkie Talkie") may be stationed with some, or each signal man. The latter precaution is especially helpful when take offs are performed from dirt runways and dust obscures the visibility.

13. The importance of correct and adequate signalling can not be over-emphasized as the success of the operation largely depends on the timing and accuracy of the take off. All signal personnel shall be thoroughly familiar with the procedure and fully understand the responsibility with which they are charged.

14. The following are the standard signals:

a. Open release: Open hand.

White flag in vertical motion.

White light in vertical motion.

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b. Close release; Closed fist.

White flag in horizontal motion.

White light in horizontal motion.

c. Hold where you are, stop, danger:

Two hands extended over head.

Red flag.

Red light.

Red flare.

d. Take up slack in tow rope:

Beckoning motion with hand.

White flag in revolving motion.

White light in revolving motion.

e. Clear for take off, ready to go:

Arms extended over head in forward motion.

White or green flag in forward motion.

Green light or white light in forward motion.

15. The number of gliders held in reserve as "spares" shall be ten percent of the number of gliders scheduled for take off.

16. Crash trucks and ambulance shall be present to remove any disabled glider from the runway.

17. The Group or other Air Force Unit Commander in command of the mission will take the necessary action, in addition to the procedure outlined herein, to insure efficient and safe operations.

By order of Colonel MANNING:

JULIUS A. KOLB
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Gordon L. Edris
GORDON L. EDRIS
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Asst C/S, A-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CG, Twelfth Air Force.
- 2 - CG, 5th Airborne Division, AFHQ.
- 2 - CG, 2d Ind Para Bde.
- 15 - CO, 60th; 62d; 64th TC Gps.
- 3 - OC, No. 3 Sq, 1st Glider Pilot Regiment.
- 1 - A-4.
- 1 - Air Insp.
- 1 - File (A-3).

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTY FIRST TROOP CARRIER WING
A.P.O. 650

7 August 1944.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

14)

GLIDER DITCHING DRILL FOR TYPE CG-4A GLIDER

GENERAL

1. The number of life rafts carried will vary of course according to the load carried. According to need rafts will be carried as follows: Raft #1 is placed with end resting on glider seats in front of left emergency exit door, and snaps on raft cover facing outward. A fifteen (15) foot length of rope will be attached to the grommet in the bow of the raft, with rope emerging from opening in cover and tied to the fuselage tubing near the upper rear corner of door jamb. The excess rope will be coiled and tied lightly by thread or twine to the tubing so that when the raft is tossed out the thread will break and the rope can play out. To hold the raft in place secure with another rope, one end of which is tied to the back-rests near the door, the rope is then run through handle on back side of raft, tied to it, then the free end is tied by slip knot to the back-rest on other side of door. Raft #2 similarly attached to right emergency exit. Raft #3 similarly attached to right rear door.


2. After ditching the cabin will rapidly submerge and it will be necessary for everyone to work with all possible speed but with precision.

Warning: Exit doors are small and can be easily blocked, therefore follow order of drill precisely. If life vests are inflated before leaving cabin you may be trapped against the roof or under wing. Remember that the glider can be easily abandoned in less than twenty (20) seconds, but if necessary don't forget that by standing on seat you can push your head through top fabric for breath of air, also that air may be trapped near roof.

DRILL

1. Pilot will warn troopers by the order, "Prepare for ditching", Troopers fasten belts.

2. Pass loose equipment (to #11) to be jettisoned through left rear door, time permitting.



3. Co-pilot will immediately jettison wheels if of combat type. He will give final warning just before touchdown. Troopers must brace themselves for impact.

4. Troopers No. 5 and 6 will pull slip knot of ropes attaching rafts to back-rests and unsnap cover of rafts. Troopers No. 7 and 8 pull cotter pin of emergency release lever. After glider is ditched all troopers release safety belts but do not inflate life-vests.

After Glider is on water

5. Troopers No. 1 and 2 kick through fabric sides immediately below front port holes and make exit, followed by pilot through left side and co-pilot through right side.

6. Troopers No. 5 and 6 pull emergency release levers and push side emergency exits and rafts into water, follow rafts out and after inflating vests proceed to inflate rafts.

Caution: Rafts are wider than the bottom of emergency exits. To keep rafts from becoming wedged, lift upward on bottom of raft when pushing out on emergency exit door.

7. Troopers No. 7 and 8 follow No. 5 and 6 through emergency exits.

8. Troopers No. 3 and 4 follow No. 7 and 8 through emergency exits.

9. Troopers No. 11 and 12 release emergency levers of rear doors. Trooper No. 13 emerges through left rear door followed by troopers No. 11 and 9. Trooper No. 12 pulls slip knot on No. 3 raft, pushing raft out and inflating it. Trooper No. 10 follows trooper No. 12 through right rear door.

10. Occupants of rafts:

Raft #1 - Pilot, Troopers No. 1, 3, 5 & 7.

Raft #2 - Co-pilot, Troopers No. 2, 4, 6 & 8.

Raft #3 - Troopers No. 9, 11, 13, 10 & 12.

Note: No. 1 and pilot and No. 2 and co-pilot should swim towards wing tip as soon as possible. If they hold to wing near fuselage they will block the exit of No. 5, 3 and No. 4 & 6 who must come out from under wing.

Group Commanding Officers will insure that airborne troops receive adequate instructions in the above drill. The fuselage of an old salvaged glider should be available for practice. Pilot and Co-pilot will go over the essential points of this drill with their respective trooper-loads, immediately prior to operational take-off.

By order of Colonel MANNING:

JULIUS A. KOLB,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A"
to BAF DAILY SUMMARY NO. 31Captured German Document

HQ 21 Mtn Corps.
4633/Ops/44.

5 July 44.

Subject: Action against air supplies to the guerillas.

1. Supplies sent to the guerillas by the Allied Air Forces have recently been on a scale which cannot be permanently tolerated. In view of the decisive significance which a stoppage, or even interruption of the regular air borne supplies to the guerillas would have on their organisation and fighting powers, Second Arm'd Army has ordered that a co-ordinated drive against the guerilla air supplies be carried out with every possible means and by every suitable branch of the army. The code name for the whole operation against the guerilla air supplies is to be "CASANOVA".

2. Air supplies for the guerillas are generally dropped. Apparently the supply aircraft is advised of the dropping zone by W/T. Comm between the guerillas at the dropping zone and the supply aircraft is usually by light flashes from the aircraft (several morse letters), which are answered by the guerilla ground troops by specially arranged flash signs and by the lighting fires in reply in pre-arranged letters. The means of comm are, as have been learned from experience, constantly changed.

The following counter measures will be taken: -

(a) Aircraft will be used for a recce of the dropping grounds and recce of the dropping grounds and recognition signals and for destroying them with bombs, the aircraft's armament and explosives of all kinds - supply bombs with time fuses.

(b) Surprise use of mobile light AA in the immediate vicinity of the dropping zones.

(c) Misleading the "enemy" aircraft by our ground troops.

(d) The dropping zones will be attacked by small Commando ops.

4. Organisation.

(a) The organisation of CASANOVA will be co-ordinated by Corps in order that mutual advantage may be taken as soon as possible of experience gained.

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(b) Detailed measures will normally be carried out in accordance with Corps directives by divs, the German General in ALBANIA and A.C.Cs. In special cases measures can be carried out independently by the above named, Corps being informed.

5. Reporting.

The success of the operations is very largely dependant on full use being made of the experience and suggestions of all those taking part. In this connection, quickest possible reporting to Corps and closet collaboration between all army HQs is necessary. All reports will be made under the code name CASANOVA. Security regulations will be borne in mind when the reports are sent back.

6. Directions for the Operation.

(a) All soldiers must be convinced of the importance of the operation so as to encourage their co-operation. Every suggestion from whatever source, will be immediately reported to Corps, tested and, if suitable, carried out.

(b) Mobility, imagination and constant change in methods are necessary. Keeping to one method of deception is generally useless even if initially successful.

(c) For small operations against enemy dropping zones, assault dets, should, as far as possible, be held in readiness or assembled from time to time, in the vicinity. Strength and armament of these dets will depend on the kind of operation and the tactical situation.

(d) The following are some examples for a possible CASANOVA op.

Night A. Fires will be lit in the prescribed pattern near the dropping zone by as many detachments as possible on the approach of enemy aircraft. At the same time flash signs will be made.

Night B. The G.A.G. reces the dropping zones or interrupts supply by its intervention and dropping of explosives. No deception measures will be adopted by ground troops.

Night C. Carefully prepared Commando ops against the dropping zones will be laid on to destroy or mine them. P.W. and booty will be taken.

Night D. Light AA should be concentrated at short notice as near to the dropping zones as possible. This might be combined with a Commando op.

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7. The areas most used for supply dropping at the moment are:-

- (a) The karaorman area North of STRUGA.
- (b) Area North of IESHKOCJE.
- (c) Area BERANE.

8. The German General in ALBANIA will be responsible for carrying out ops against enemy supply areas in the KARACHTAN, in accordance with the foregoing directive.

9. Success cannot be judged only by the dropping of stores on our own troops as a result of our deception measures, nor by the landing of enemy planes on our territory. The important thing is that the enemy is interrupted in his supply dropping and loses confidence through having continually to adopt new measures. The laying out of dummy landing zones will force "enemy" aircraft to remain over hostile territory longer than anticipated. The short nights are at the same time making the undisturbed performance of his task more difficult.

10. All HQs concerned are requested to report regularly to Corps under the code name CASANOVA, the results of recce and their experiences and suggestions.

(signed) FELIN

(Translation of a German document recently captured in MONTENEGRO)

A TRUE COPY:

ROBERT B. COX,
Lt. Col, Air Corps.

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ANNEX 'E'

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
AIR INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 103
6 November 1944

E X T R A C T

FLYING IN THE BALKANS

An Allied translation of a German document concerning flying in Balkan countries has been received, certain sections of which are presented here for their possible use to MAAF pilots and navigators.

Instrument Flights: If the weather makes it impossible to maintain the prescribed relative altitude of 1000 m. while flying by contact over mountainous terrain, the flight will be considered an instrument flight and only properly certified pilots will be cleared.

In the Balkans, more than anywhere else, the following rules are fundamental:

- a. Either a clear view of the ground and a knowledge of wind conditions, or faultless instrument flying at a safe altitude.
- b. Always use dead reckoning in conjunction with other methods of navigation.

Flight Plans: If the weather permits an intermediate landing at a field in the general direction of the destination, the intermediate landing will be made and the pilot will ask for another clearance.

Radio Aids: Radio bearings over the mountains of the Balkans are inaccurate. The beam is subject to unpredictable distortions by the terrain. False lines of position and inaccurate fixes result. Therefore, the most exact dead reckoning is necessary.

Difficulties caused by terrain and weather: Flights in the Balkans are difficult, not because of the absolute height of the mountains but because of their conformation, which is unlike that of any other European mountains. This mountain structure strongly influences weather conditions, causing violent squalls, extended fields of descending air currents, and sudden thunder storms which, in a moment, may hem one in on all sides.

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Squall Zones: The following localities are particularly feared for squalls. ((Data in double brackets are not part of the text.))

- a. The Belischiza ((Bjelasica(?); $43^{\circ} 10' N$, $18^{\circ} 25' E$)) chain of mountains (2040 m), near the Rupel Pass (?). These mountains are rightly considered the most dangerous in Europe.
- b. Mount Kandelion (($38^{\circ} 40' N$, $23^{\circ} 28' E$)) on Euboea, which rises abruptly to 1218 m.
- c. Mount Tavgetos (($36^{\circ} 40' N$, $22^{\circ} 20' E$)), (2410 m), SW of Sparta in the Peloponnesus.
- d. The crests of the Balkans ((N Bulgaria; $42^{\circ} 45' N$, $24^{\circ} 00' E$ - $25^{\circ} 30' E$; rising to 2371 m)) and of the S. Carpathians ((N Roumania; rising to 2305 m. in the Rodnei Mts, $47^{\circ} 35' N$, $24^{\circ} 35' E$)).
- e. The North Albanian Alps ((rising to 2656 m; $42^{\circ} 30' N$, $20^{\circ} 00' E$)).
- f. Mounts Vardusia ((2495 m)), Giona ((2510 m)), and Parnassos ((2457 m)), in central Greece (($38^{\circ} 35' N$, $22^{\circ} 00' E$ - $22^{\circ} 45' E$)).

Because of the peculiar violence and suddenness of squalls in the above areas, the prescribed safety altitude must be carefully maintained.

Exceptions: If unusual circumstances, e.g. enemy action, make it necessary to fly lower than the prescribed safety altitude, care must nevertheless be exercised not to cross passes or ranges at too low an altitude.

Flying in Valleys: When flying parallel to a mountain in zones where descending currents are frequent, one must take care not to approach the mountain too closely. Never turn in toward the mountain or you will fly into the downward eddies.

Thunderstorms: In the summer, thunderstorms are frequent in the valleys. They gather and break suddenly and may pass over to adjacent valleys. If such weather is foreseen, fly high enough to avoid it. Otherwise, the decision either to turn back or to avoid the storm by crossing a mountain range must be made and acted on very quickly. Only in large level valleys is it possible to fly under the storm and maintain visual contact. In

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mountainous territory, the attempt to do so means total loss of the aircraft, as the higher ranges are always masked by the clouds.

Bad Weather Routes: On especially important flights when the ground must be kept in sight and the weather prevents flying at the prescribed safety altitude, success depends on knowing the bad weather routes. The pilot must have had plenty of Balkan experience. A few of the large Balkan valleys are suitable routes for bad weather flying, and experience has shown that no others may be followed. Pilots must not explore new routes on their own. Such adventure usually ends in a crack-up.

Continuous and exact pilotage is necessary to follow the right valley. Maps on a scale of 1:2,000,000 or 1:1,000,000 are useless in this connection. Only the 1:500,000 navigation maps are suitable. It is indispensable that the route be studied before take-off. The routes suitable for bad weather flying can be deduced from aero-geographical descriptions of the Balkan countries.

Maps: Maps of the Balkans are sometimes inaccurate. Visual fixes should therefore be determined not by one detail but by many in connection with general orientation. The given height of a terrain feature may vary by as much as 100 m. from one map to another. Always assume the greatest given height when determining the altitude at which to fly. Use only latest editions of maps. In particular, when using the 1:2,000,000 navigation map, make sure it is dated July 1943 or later. Copies of earlier editions will be destroyed. Suitable sheets of the International World Map, 1:1,000,000, can be used for general orientation, but the 1:500,000 map should be used for navigation. It is to be taken into consideration that, even on this map, heights may be in error. The greatest errors occur in the sheets covering Yugoslavia and Greece. (CSDIC (Air) Report No. A.467).

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